An Affair To Remember: The State of the Crime of Adultery in the Military by Annuschat, Katherine









   
 
 









An Affair To Remember: The State of the                        
Crime of Adultery in the Military 
KATHERINE ANNUSCHAT* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1162 
II.  THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN ADULTERY STATUTES AND THE
CIVILIAN APPROACH TO ADULTERY ................................................................. 1166 
III.  THE ORIGINS OF THE MILITARY CODE AND ITS APPROACH TO 
ADULTERY ....................................................................................................... 1170 
IV.  HOW THE PROSECUTION PROVES ADULTERY UNDER ARTICLES 
133 AND 134.................................................................................................... 1176 
A. The Offense of Adultery Under Article 134 ............................................ 1177 
1. Prejudicial to Good Order and Discipline ...................................... 1179 
2. Discrediting to the Military ............................................................ 1182 
B. Prosecuting Adultery Under Article 133 ................................................ 1185 
V. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONTINUING TO PUNISH ADULTERY 
IN THE MILITARY ............................................................................................. 1191 
A. Preserving Honor in the Armed Services ............................................... 1192 
B. Upholding Good Order and Discipline .................................................. 1194 
C. Maintaining the Trust of the American People ...................................... 1196 
* J.D. Candidate, University of San Diego School of Law, 2011; B.S. Journalism, 
University of Kansas, 2006; B.A. Spanish, University of Kansas, 2006.  I would first like 
to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Donald Dripps, for his invaluable insight during 
the development of this topic as well as his feedback throughout the writing process.  I
am also incredibly grateful to Laura Brooks for putting as much effort into editing this
Comment as if it were her own, to Erik Johnson for being infinitely patient as well as 
incredibly thorough in his feedback, and the entire San Diego Law Review staff for all 
their hard work and the opportunity to publish this Comment.  Finally, this Comment is 
dedicated to my husband, Captain Damien Annuschat USMC, for not only inspiring me 
to explore the area of military law, but for all his love, support, and encouragement in
everything I do. 
 1161
ANNUSCHAT FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2010 9:59 AM      
 
 
    
  
 















   
   












VI. WHY THE MILITARY WOULD BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT THE 
CRIME OF ADULTERY ....................................................................................... 1198 
VII.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 1204
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2008, a general court-martial1 convicted nineteen-year Navy 
supply officer Lieutenant Commander Syneeda Penland of adultery and
sentenced her to sixty days in the brig.2  As a result of this conviction,
the Navy dismissed Penland just a few months short of retirement, 
causing her to lose her severance pay, health benefits, and military
pension.3  Penland—unsuccessfully—fought her dismissal, alleging that 
the adultery accusations were made in retaliation for her attempts to 
expose financial improprieties in her command.4  The adultery charges
stemmed from an alleged sexual relationship between Penland, who is 
single, and a married junior officer, Lieutenant (junior grade) Mark 
Wiggan.5  Wiggan, on the other hand, was not prosecuted.6 
1. A court-martial is “[a] military . . . court of officers appointed by a commander 
to try persons for offenses under military law.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 328 (4th ed. 2002).  The term can also refer to a trial by a military tribunal. 
Id.  The plural form of court-martial is courts-martial.  Id. 
2. Penland v. Mabus, 643 F. Supp. 2d 14, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2009).  The Navy court-
martial convicted Penland of adultery, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, 
failure to obey a lawful order, and making a false official statement.  Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus at 2, Penland, 643 F. Supp. 2d 14 (No. 1:09-cv-01417), 2009 WL 2428408. 
All of these charges stemmed out of the same event: Penland’s sexual relationship with a 
fellow Navy officer. See id.  Furthermore, Penland served forty-five days in the brig 
before being released.  Penland, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 17.  A brig is how the military refers 
to a jail or guardhouse on a military base. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY,
supra note 1, at 180.
3. Penland’s forced separation from the Navy was scheduled to take effect on
July 31, 2009. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 3.  Penland, in 
response, filed several motions to delay her separation, first alleging errors in her court-
martial proceedings, including unlawful command influence, and in the alternative 
arguing that separation would cause her to lose her medical benefits that she requires for 
treatment of her medical condition, thrombocytosis.  See Penland, 643 F. Supp. 2d. at 
17–19, 21.  The court denied her motions for injunction and, as a result, allowed her 
discharge to be carried out as planned. See id. at 23.  Her discharge took away her severance 
pay, pension, and health insurance benefits.  Steve Liewer, Navy, Officer Differ over 
Pending Dismissal, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 18, 2009, at B1. 
4. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 2. 
 5. Janet McMahon, Rampant Sexism, Navy Officer Says, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERVICE (July 31, 2009, 3:33 PM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2009/07/31/Rampant
_Sexism_Navy_Officer_Says.htm. 
 6. Lauren Reynolds, Court-Martialed Navy Officer Alleges Sex, Lies, Corruption, 
10NEWS.COM (July 22, 2009, 12:39 PM), http://www.10news.com/print/20135300/detail.
html. 
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In 2003, Army Captain James Yee faced a slew of serious criminal 
charges, including espionage, spying, and aiding the enemy.7 When
these charges fell through, allegedly because the evidence against Yee
amounted to nothing, the Army brought significantly less serious charges 
against him, including mishandling classified documents, possessing
pornography, and adultery.8 At Yee’s first hearing on these new allegations, 
the prosecution did not begin by presenting evidence of the more serious
charges but with introducing a witness to the adultery accusation.9 
Yee’s parents, his wife, and four-year-old daughter were present and
listened as a Navy Lieutenant testified about an affair with Yee.10  After
this hearing, the prosecution asked for a delay and eventually dropped all 
of the charges.11  Gary Solis, a former prosecutor for the Marines and 
current adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University, stated that
the Army pursued the adultery charges to “embarrass and humiliate” 
Yee when the case had “turned to crap.”12 
Under military law, adultery is a crime under Article 134 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).13  According to the Manual
for Courts-Martial (MCM),14 a servicemember is guilty of adultery
under article 134 when the servicemember has sexual intercourse with 
an individual, and at that time, either of the two is married to someone 
else.15  Hence, a servicemember does not need to be married to be found
 7. Laura Parker, The Ordeal of Chaplain Yee, USA TODAY, May 17, 2004, at A1, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-05-16-yee-cover_x.htm.  Yee 
faced a potential death penalty conviction based on these charges. See id. 
8. See Oliver Burkeman, ‘He Is Not Guilty and He Is Not Innocent,’ THE GUARDIAN
(London) (Mar. 30, 2004), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/30/usa.guantanamo/
print.
 9. Parker, supra note 7.
10. See id.
11. See id.  Not only did the prosecution drop all of the criminal charges, but the 
Army even removed the case from Yee’s permanent military record. See id. 
 12. Burkeman, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
13. See JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES pt. IV, ¶ 62, (2008 ed.) [hereinafter MCM], available at http://www.
loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2008.pdf.  Adultery could also be prosecuted
against officers under article 133.  See infra Part IV.B.  For a discussion of the history
and progression of the UCMJ, see infra text accompanying notes 61–68. 
14. The MCM is the tool used to implement the articles of the UCMJ and “also 
includes the Military Rules of Evidence and the procedural Rules for Court-Martial.” 
Kathryn R. Burke, The Privacy Penumbra and Adultery: Does Military Necessity Justify 
an Adultery Regulation and What Will It Take for the Court To Declare It 
Unconstitutional?, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 301, 306 (1997). 
15. See MCM, supra note 13. 
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guilty of adultery.16  In addition, the adulterous conduct must be prejudicial 
of good order and discipline in the armed forces, or be “of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.”17  An officer may be punished 
for adultery under article 133 as well, as long as the court finds the 
adulterous conduct meets the standard of conduct unbecoming an officer 
and a gentleman.18 
Even though criminal sanctions for adultery in the civilian world have 
played a role in American jurisprudence, that role has been relatively
minor.19  In fact, the majority of states have now decriminalized adultery.20 
Moreover, even in the states with adultery statutes still on the books, 
adultery prosecutions are nearly unheard of.21  And after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, adultery prosecutions may even 
violate a citizen’s constitutional right to privacy.22 
In contrast, the military still regularly pursues adultery prosecutions,
evidenced by the 900 men and women court-martialed in the 1990s
16. For example, Penland was not married, yet because her sexual partner was 
married, she was also guilty of adultery.  See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 
2, at 2.
 17. MCM, supra note 13.  This additional element may be easier for the prosecution to
establish than it seems.  See infra Part IV.A.1–2. 
18. See MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 59.  For an explanation of how the military 
prosecutes adultery under article 133, see infra Part IV.B. 
19. See Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 
30 J. FAM. L. 45, 49 (1991).  Siegel states that the various laws criminalizing adultery
“crept largely unnoticed into the twentieth century.” See id.  He goes on to state that the 
chief legal deterrent to adultery before World War II was not the criminal sanction but
the fault-based divorce system. See id.
20. Only less than half of the states still have adultery statutes on the books.  See
infra note 36.  See also Burke, supra note 14, at 309–10 (“Presently, twenty-one states
and the District of Columbia continue to criminalize adultery.”); Jeremy D. Weinstein,
Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 225–26 (discussing
the history of the criminalization of adultery, and noting that even in states where it is 
still a crime, it is generally only a misdemeanor).
21. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
345–46 (1993).  Friedman points out that adultery prosecutions are so rare that when a 
Wisconsin district attorney actually prosecuted someone for adultery in 1990, the story
rated the front page of the New York Times.  See id. at 346.  More recently, in 2004 in
Virginia, the jilted lover of John R. Bushey Jr. turned him in for violating Virginia’s
adultery statute. See Jonathan Turley, Of Lust and the Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2004, 
at B1.  In response, Bushey planned to take his case to the Supreme Court, and the 
American Civil Liberties Union agreed to represent him. See id. Bushey, however, changed 
his mind and agreed to perform twenty hours of community service as punishment.  Id.
22. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).  The Supreme Court found 
that a consensual sodomy statute in Texas was unconstitutional, holding that private, 
consensual, adult sexual conduct is protected under the right to privacy. See id. at 578; 
see also infra text accompanying notes 46–50. 
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alone for charges that included adultery.23  Concededly, many of these 
cases also involved other, more serious charges, such as rape.24  Even so,
several high-profile cases in recent years have led observers to criticize 
the military for what many see as a conscious decision to pursue adultery
charges against servicemembers in an effort to publicly humiliate them.25 
Recognizing the rarity of adultery prosecutions in the civilian world, it 
may be surprising that adultery is still actively prosecuted under military 
law.  Yet, the American people may be even more surprised to learn that 
civilians who accompany the United States military to combat zones 
around the world are now also subject to the UCMJ, and, as a result, 
possible prosecutions for adultery.26 
The recent cases against Penland and Yee27 demonstrate with clarity 
the military’s willingness to pursue adultery prosecutions for questionable
motives.  In light of this fact, and the obsolescence of these statutes in 
the public mind, adultery should be removed from the enumerated
offenses under article 134.  Part II will discuss the history of the crime of
adultery in American jurisprudence, including the current state of adultery 
as a crime, as well as the current public opinion on adultery in light of
several recent high-profile adultery scandals in the media. 
Part III will delve into the history of adultery prosecutions in the 
military, first by explaining the origins of the UCMJ and then by showing 
how the military punishes adultery through the procedures listed in the 
MCM, including nonjudicial punishment and court-martial. 
Part IV will discuss the offense of adultery under articles 133 and 134,
including the elements of the crime and the way the military proves the 
elements at court-martial.  It will also illustrate with real-life examples 
how the military proves its case on adultery, demonstrating that proving 
23. James M. Winner, Beds with Sheets but No Covers: The Right to Privacy and 
the Military’s Regulation of Adultery, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1077 (1998). 
24. See, e.g.,  United States v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146, 146 (C.M.A. 1986) (charging 
Hickson with rape, sodomy, and adultery), overruled on other grounds by United States 
v. Hill, 48 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v. Tate, NMCCA 200201202, 2005
WL 3111979, at *1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2005) (charging Tate with conspiracy, 
making a false official statement, premeditated murder, sodomy, and adultery); see also 
infra note 236 and accompanying text. 
25. Two recent examples include the adultery prosecutions against Penland and
Yee. See supra notes 2–12 and accompanying text. 
26. See R. Peter Masterton, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilians in Contingency
Operations: A New Twist, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 65, 65 (2009). 
27. See supra notes 2–12 and accompanying text. 
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the crime may be quite easy despite the burden of proof required by the
MCM. 
Part V will probe into the military’s rationale for continuing to 
prosecute the crime of adultery, despite the fact it has fallen out of favor 
in the civilian world.  This Part will show that even though the military
has valid reasons for taking action against some adulterous conduct, the 
continued prosecution of adultery has the tendency to impede these
interests.
Finally, Part VI will explain how removing adultery from the offenses 
under article 134 would benefit not only servicemembers and the civilians
now subject to the UCMJ, but also the public perception of the armed
forces.
II. THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN ADULTERY STATUTES AND   
THE CIVILIAN APPROACH TO ADULTERY 
Adultery has been a crime in most American jurisdictions since the
colonial period, with sanctions ranging from death to a fine.28  Historically, 
two main rationales justified the punishment of adultery as a crime.29 
One theory for punishing adultery was to preempt violent acts of
vengeance by providing an alternative way to right the wrong against the 
husband.30  Under this view, adultery was considered a private wrong 
that invaded a husband’s rights over his wife and not as a wrong against 
society.31  This rationale for punishment, though influential in early
English law,32 did not carry the same weight with the Puritans in America. 
Instead, the rationale for prosecuting adultery in early American history 
28. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 41, 128, 332, 346.  Friedman explains that 
during the colonial period, although an adultery conviction did carry the death penalty in 
some colonies, an execution for adultery was a rare event. Id. at 41.  By the time of the
American Revolution, the criminal justice system in America paid very little attention to
victimless sex crimes, such as adultery, id. at 128, and by the twentieth century,
enforcement of adultery laws was “patchy and sporadic,” id. at 332. 
29. See Weinstein, supra note 20, at 202, 225. 
30. See id. at 204–05; see also C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters but Should 
Marriage?: Adultery, Fraternization, and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J.
177, 187 (1999) (“[C]riminal sanctions for adultery were originally based on the state’s 
need to preempt violent and disruptive acts . . . .”).
31. See Weinstein, supra note 20, at 202. 
32. See id. at 202–03.  Adultery, however, was not a crime under the common law 
of England. See United States v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146, 147 (C.M.A. 1986), overruled
on other grounds by United States v. Hill, 48 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 1997).  As a result, it 
was punishable in this country only when a statute prohibited it in that jurisdiction.  See 
id.
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was mainly ecclesiastical.33  The Puritans punished adultery because, as 
an offense against God, it amounted to a threat against society itself.34 
These early Americans made adultery with a married woman a capital
offense, but convictions were rare due to views that the sentence for the
crime was too harsh.35 
The Puritan belief lived on in American jurisprudence and most states
made adultery an offense by statute.36  Many of these statutes, however, 
were poorly enforced and ignored by many Americans,37 but still
provided opportunities for blackmail and extortion.38  In 1955, drafters 
of the Model Penal Code recommended that adultery be decriminalized,
taking the position that it was merely private immorality, falling outside
the scope of criminal law.39  In response, many states removed adultery 
statutes from their books.40  In the states that still have an adultery 
33. See Hickson, 22 M.J. at 146–47 (“‘In the . . . [eyes] of the canon law, adultery
violated the marriage vow’ . . . .” (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 377 (2d
ed. 1969))).  See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 32 (“[I]t would be hard to
overemphasize the influence of religion . . . in shaping the criminal codes . . . .”).
34. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 34.  Friedman explains the Puritans did not 
distinguish between a victimless crime and a crime of violence.  See id.  Under this view, 
crimes were sins, and sins were crimes, and any crime against God constituted a threat to 
society, such as when God’s anger laid waste to Sodom and Gomorrah.  See id. 
35. See id. at 41. 
 36. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 226.  States with adultery statutes currently on the 
books include the following: ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-501 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 798.01 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601 
(2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507
(2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 
272, § 14 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.30 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36 
(West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 
(LexisNexis 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-09 (1997); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21, § 871 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 
(2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (LexisNexis 
2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 2008). 
37. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 332, 346. 
 38. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 226. 
 39. Siegel, supra note 19, at 49.  The American Law Institute went so far as to 
label adultery laws “dead-letter statutes” that were inevitably ineffective and a waste of
law enforcement resources. Id.
40. See Weinstein, supra note 20, at 226.  At least eleven states repealed their 
adultery statutes in the twenty years following the Model Penal Code’s recommendation 
to decriminalize adultery. See id. at 226 & n.233; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 269a–b 
(repealed 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.1 (repealed 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-908
(repealed 1969) (substituting a misdemeanor adultery statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3507 (2007)); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.070 (repealed 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
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statute intact, the crime is usually not more than a misdemeanor, with 
punishment often only amounting to a small fine.41 
Even though the crime of adultery still exists in more than twenty 
jurisdictions,42 one will be hard-pressed to find a state that will pursue
adultery prosecutions.43 This scarcity of prosecutions reflects an
unwillingness by the government to bring a criminal action for adultery.44 
Moreover, there exists a strong argument that adultery is protected
under the constitutional right of privacy.45  The Supreme Court in
Lawrence v. Texas stated that “liberty gives substantial protection to 
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex.”46  Although this decision only applied specifically to
sodomy statutes, the language the majority used suggested that any
private, adult, consensual, sexual conduct should receive some protection 
under the constitutional right of privacy.47  Under this definition, adultery
is a type of conduct that would fall under the privacy right.48  Tellingly, 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion specifically mentioned adultery laws
17, § 101 (repealed 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:88-1 (repealed 1978); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12-22-09 (repealed 1973) (substituting a misdemeanor adultery statute, 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09 (1997)); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.005 (repealed 1971); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-17 (repealed 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 201–202
(repealed 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.110 (repealed 1975). 
41. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 10-501 (“A person who violates this
section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction shall be fined $10.”); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-6-2 (“Every person who shall commit adultery shall be fined not exceeding
five hundred dollars ($500) . . . .”). 
42. See supra note 36. 
43. See supra note 37. 
44. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 128, 332.  The government’s reluctance to 
pursue prosecutions may be due to the concerns pointed out by the American Law 
Institute, such as the ineffectiveness of adultery statutes in deterring the act, as well as
the waste of law enforcement resources in the investigation of adultery charges. See
Siegel, supra note 19, at 49. 
45. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). 
46. Id.  This decision addressed the constitutionality of a sodomy statute in Texas. 
After this decision, the only government entity that may prosecute adults for consensual 
sodomy is the military.  Joseph T. Gasper II, The Road Not Taken: Decriminalizing
Private Consensual Sodomy in the Military, 49 HOW. L.J. 139, 140 (2005).  When article 
125, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2006)—the statute making consensual sodomy illegal—was
challenged after the Lawrence decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
ruled in United States v. Marcum that article 125 was constitutional as applied to the 
appellant, finding that his conduct was outside the protected liberty interest recognized in
Lawrence.  See United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 200 (C.A.A.F. 2004).  For further 
discussion of how the military has reacted to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence 
v. Texas, see Gasper, supra. 
47. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568–72, 578–79. 
48. Adultery is defined as “voluntary sexual intercourse between a married man 
and a woman not his wife, or between a married woman and a man not her husband.” 
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 19 (4th ed. 2000). 
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as being called into question by the decision.49  Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has not yet expanded the right to privacy to include adultery, and
many state adultery statutes remain.50 
Even though adultery prosecutions have declined significantly in the 
civilian world,51 this country has not grown immune to the shock and
scandal involved in affairs of the heart.  Several high-profile adultery 
scandals have rocked the American public in recent years.  These include
former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer’s escapade in a prostitution 
ring52 and South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford’s secret affair with an
Argentine woman.53  Even though both of these men were powerful figures
in their respective states—both of which still have adultery statutes on 
the books54—neither faced even a threat of prosecution under his
respective state adultery statutes.55  The reactions to both of these cases
suggest that, although Americans still disapprove of adultery, most do 
not expect an extramarital tryst to merit criminal prosecution, even when 
committed by some of the most important figures in government.56 
49. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
50. See supra note 36. 
51. See supra note 37. 
52. A federal wiretap revealed Governor Spitzer to be a client of a high-end 
prostitution ring.  Michael M. Grynbaum, Spitzer Resigns, Citing Personal Failings, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/nyregion/12cnd-resign. 
html.  Forty-eight hours later, Spitzer resigned as Governor of New York.  Id.  He faced 
no charges for adultery.
 53. Governor Mark Sanford took several secret trips to Buenos Aires to visit his
mistress, leaving his own aides uncertain of his whereabouts for days.  See Jim Rutenberg &
Shaila Dewan, Back at Work, Governor Puts Apology on Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/27 sanford.html.  On
an interesting side note, Sanford is a member of the armed services, a U.S. Air Force
reservist, but did not receive any disciplinary action from the military for the affair— 
another example of the uneven enforcement of the crime of adultery in the military.  See
Schulyer Kopf, Sanford To Report for Reserve Duty, POST AND COURIER (Charleston, 
S.C.), Aug. 12, 2009, at B3, available at http://www.postandcourier.com/ news/2009/aug/12/
sanford-to-report-for-reserve-duty/.  The Governor did not face impeachment either, but rather
the South Carolina Legislature opted to censure him for secretly leaving the state to carry
on his affair.  See Shaila Dewan, Gov. Sanford Won’t Face Charges on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 2010, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 05/04/us/04sanford.
html.  In addition, Sanford paid $74,000 to the State Ethics Commission for thirty-seven
ethics violations.  See id.
 54. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 
(2003). 
55. See sources cited supra notes 52–53. 
56. Former President Bill Clinton is another example.  See Richard K. Neumann 
Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. 
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III. THE ORIGINS OF THE MILITARY CODE AND ITS
APPROACH TO ADULTERY 
The purposes of military law, as listed in the MCM, are promoting 
justice, “maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces,”
promoting efficiency and effectiveness in the military, and strengthening 
the national security of the United States.57  Military law has jurisdiction 
over all branches of the armed forces, including the Navy, the Army, the
Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.58  In addition, civilians
who accompany the armed forces during “contingency operations” now
fall under the jurisdiction of military law.59  This includes any contractors
and civilian employees who are currently in Iraq or Afghanistan.60 
Congress first implemented the UCMJ in May of 1950.61  Congress 
drafted this legislation during the aftermath of World War II, at a time 
when lawmakers first and foremost sought to protect the rights of 
military personnel.62  The UCMJ protected servicemembers against self-
L.Q. 161, 273–74 (2007).  Clinton’s numerous affairs demonstrated that even a man in 
arguably the most important position in government—not to mention the Commander in 
Chief of the military—need not fear a criminal prosecution for his affairs.  Despite the
President’s military title, he is not subject to the UCMJ like other servicemembers.  See 
Raul V. Esquivel, III, Comment, Implications of the Military’s Proscription of Adultery
upon Individual Privacy, 47 LOY. L. REV. 835, 844 (2001).  Even so, some military
personnel characterized Clinton as the “hypocrite-in-chief” in reaction to his admissions. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  For a discussion of the American public’s 
reaction to Clinton’s affair and impeachment, see Neumann, supra, at 288–89. 
57. MCM, supra note 13, at pt. I, ¶ 3.
58. See 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4) (2006). 
59. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006).  This is a recent development, due to the 
passage of a law by Congress in 2006, the John Warner National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2007.  See Masterton, supra note 26, at 65 & n.1.  Before the passage 
of this act, civilians accompanying the military were subject to the UCMJ and courts-
martial only during a declared war, something that has not occurred since World War II.
See id. at 69.  For further discussion of this new development in military justice and the
accompanying issues, see id.
 60. Masterton, supra note 26, at 65.  The number of civilian contractors currently
accompanying the military is uncertain, with the Pentagon in April 2009 estimating 
160,000 civilian contractors and the U.S. Central Command recording more than
242,000 a month prior.  No Precise Number for Contractors in Iraq, Afghanistan: US, 
AFP, November 2, 2009, available at Factiva, Doc. No. AFPR000020091102e5b2008vi. 
 61. Burke, supra note 14, at 305.  Congress implemented the UCMJ through its 
constitutional power “[t]o raise and support Armies, . . . [t]o provide and maintain a 
Navy; . . . [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces; . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper . . . .”  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 12–14, 18. 
 62. NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 50TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 2 (2001), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/documents/cox_comm_report2.pdf?rd=1. 
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incrimination fifteen years before Miranda v. Arizona,63 “permitted 
relatively broad access to free counsel, and incorporated many of the 
best features of federal and state criminal justice systems.”64  This  
legislation was landmark in that it created the fairest system of court-
martial of any country in the world at that time.65 
When Congress enacted the UCMJ, it incorporated two types of
offenses: civilian crimes, such as murder, and special military offenses,
such as dereliction of duty.66  Congress based the definitions of the 
civilian crimes included in the UCMJ on the laws of Maryland at that 
time.67  It included these crimes in order to standardize military law with 
civilian law, demonstrating a belief that servicemembers should not be 
exempt from the same crimes for which their civilian counterparts are 
accountable.68 
Congress enacted the UCMJ as a series of federal statutes to create the 
substantive criminal provisions for the military.69  In contrast, the MCM 
is a compilation of military common law and court-martial procedural 
and evidentiary rules.70  The MCM also creates many substantive crimes 
not explicitly present in the UCMJ, with the purpose of clarifying the 
general criminal statutes of the UCMJ.71  One example is adultery, 
 63. NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 2; see Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 64. NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 2. 
65. Id.
66. See United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52, 57 (C.M.A. 1979).  In addition, the 
military courts and the civilian courts have concurrent jurisdiction over offenses that
exist in both military and civilian laws, whereas the military has sole jurisdiction over 
any purely military charge, such as desertion.  See Hopkins, supra note 30, at 210–11. 
67. See Harris, 8 M.J. at 55.  The U.S. Court of Military Appeals explained in this 
decision that the criminal law of the District of Columbia was a traditionally used source
for defining misconduct in the military, and questions of common law that arose in the 
District of Columbia were often resolved by considering the law in Maryland.  See id. at
56–57. 
68. See Gasper, supra note 46, at 162. 
69. See Burke, supra note 14, at 305; Hopkins, supra note 30, at 211; see also 10
U.S.C. §§ 801–934 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (setting forth the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which includes a subchapter entitled “Punitive Articles”).
 70. Hopkins, supra note 30, at 211–12.  A committee of all three services drafted
the first Manual for Courts-Martial issued under the UCMJ in 1951.  See The Library of 
Congress, Manuals for Courts-Martial, MILITARY LEGAL RESOURCES, http://www.loc.gov/ 
rr/frd/Military_Law/CM-manuals.html (last updated Sept. 30, 2010).
71. See Hopkins, supra note 30, at 212.  General statutes refers to the general 
articles, article 133 for officers and article 134 for all servicemembers.  Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933–934 (2006).  The purpose of creating the general 
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which is included in the MCM as one of more than fifty examples of
types of conduct that merit a prosecution under article 134.72  The MCM 
also differs from the UCMJ in that it is not enacted by Congress but by 
the executive branch and members of the Department of Defense and
military branches.73  In that sense, crimes created by the MCM, such as
adultery, come directly from the rulemakers in the military, rather than
Congress.  Perhaps this is one reason why the military has become
disjointed from the civilian world in this field.74 
Adultery has long affected military life.75  Anecdotal accounts by
servicemembers portray adultery in the military as just as common as in
the civilian world, if not more so.76 Their comments range from 
characterizing adultery as being “as commonplace as fleas on a
articles was to enforce longstanding military customs by prohibiting conduct not 
specifically proscribed elsewhere in the UCMJ. See Diane H. Mazur, Is “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” Unconstitutional After Lawrence? What It Will Take To Overturn the Policy,
15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 430 (2004) (referring to the purpose of Article 134). 
These articles have been deemed controversial because any act may be punishable under
them, as long as the court finds the act to be prejudicial to good order and discipline or 
discrediting to the armed forces, or, for officers, constitutes conduct unbecoming an 
officer and a gentleman.  See Elizabeth L. Hillman, Gentlemen Under Fire: The U.S. 
Military and “Conduct Unbecoming,” 26 LAW & INEQ. 1, 5–6 (2008); Elizabeth Beard 
McLaughlin, A “Society Apart?” The Military’s Response to the Threat of AIDS, ARMY 
LAW., Oct. 1993, at 3, 11.  For further discussion of the general articles, see infra Part 
IV.A–B. 
72. See MCM, supra note 13.  David A. Schlueter explains that throughout the 
years, various offenses commonly associated with article 134 were compiled into the 
MCM, which describes the offenses and the elements necessary to establish guilt.  See
DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2-6
(1982). 
73. See 10 U.S.C. § 121 (2006) (“The President may prescribe regulations to carry
out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.”); 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (“The 
head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe regulations for 
the government of his department [and] the conduct of its employees . . . .”). 
74. See NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 2.  The military also 
failed to decriminalize private consensual sodomy after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lawrence v. Texas.  See supra note 46. 
75. See Hopkins, supra note 30, at 234; Christopher Scott Maravilla, The Other 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Adultery Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice After
Lawrence v. Texas, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 659, 660 (2009) (“Adultery among members of
the Armed Forces is considered common.”); see also Ian Fisher, Army’s Adultery Rule Is 
Don’t Get Caught, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1997, at A1  (describing the informal working 
rule on adultery in the military as “do what you want, but don’t do it blatantly and don’t 
get caught”). 
76. In the early 1950s, Alfred Kinsey’s study of sexual activity reported that one-
half of married men and one-fourth of married women committed adultery sometime in
their married lives.  See  ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN 
FEMALE 416 (1953); ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
585 (1948). 
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buffalo,”77 to claims of knowing several high-ranking officers “who are
well known to be involved in such activity [as adultery] and it is simply
winked at.”78 Despite the long history of adultery in the military,79 there
are very few cases pre-1984 that involve a prosecution for simple adultery 
under the general article, article 134.80  A probable explanation for this
lack of prosecutions is that the original UCMJ did not include a statute
prohibiting adultery.81  In 1984, however, an amendment to the MCM 
brought the addition of an adultery offense to the black-letter military
criminal law for the first time.82  Rather than a uniquely military offense, 
adultery represented a crime originating in the civilian code,83 and in that 
area the UCMJ has usually striven to mirror trends in the civilian 
world.84  Given that fact, it is perplexing that as adultery prosecutions
 77. Hopkins, supra note 30, at 202 (quoting Captain Barbara Wilson, United States
Air Force (Retired), on her twenty-two years of active-duty service).
78. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Military Appeals,
Johanns v. United States, 474 U.S. 850 (1985) (No. 85-238), 1985 WL 696454, at *14. 
79. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
 80. Hopkins, supra note 30, at 234.  Even though a specific adultery offense did 
not exist until the 1980s in the MCM, military courts have always had the power to 
punish adultery either as conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentlemen under article 
133 or as conduct that is either prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to 
bring discredit on the armed forces under the general article, article 134.  See Uniform 
Code of Military Justice art. 133–134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933–934 (2006). 
81. See Walter T. Cox, III, Consensual Sex Crimes in the Armed Forces: A Primer
for the Uninformed, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 791, 795–96 (2007).  Even though 
the original UCMJ did not include a specific prohibition of adultery, it did include the
offense of adultery in its Table of Maximum Punishments in the MCM, authorizing a 
dishonorable discharge and confinement of up to one year for the offense.  See United 
States v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146, 148 (C.M.A. 1986), overruled by United States v. Hill,
48 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 1997). 
82. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV, ¶ 62 (1984 ed.), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-1984.pdf. 
83. See Gasper, supra note 46, at 164. 
84. One example of the UCMJ’s mirroring trends in civilian laws is the addition of
stalking to the list of sexual offenses under article 120a in 2006. See Uniform Code of
Military Justice art. 120a, 10 U.S.C. § 920a (2006).  In addition, article 119a, titled 
“Death or injury of an unborn child,” was added in 2004 in response to the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act of 2004.  See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 119a, 10 
U.S.C. § 919a (2006); Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841
(2006).  Another example of a civilian trend showing up in the UCMJ is the addition of
the offense of patronizing a prostitute to paragraph 97 of article 134, pandering and
prostitution. See MCM, supra note 13, at pt. IV, ¶ 97; see also 63C AM. JUR. 2D
Prostitution § 14 (2009) (explaining that because courts traditionally interpreted prostitution
statutes as inapplicable to patrons, many jurisdictions exacted legislation specifically
directed at patrons). 
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have fallen out of favor in the civilian world,85 they have gained
considerable momentum in the military.86 
Besides the much greater number of adultery prosecutions in the
military than in the civilian justice system, the penalty for adultery is 
also much harsher for servicemembers.  In Maryland, for example, the 
state punishes adultery as a misdemeanor with a $10 fine.87  In stark 
contrast, the MCM lists the maximum penalty for adultery as 
“[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
confinement for [one] year,” essentially equating the offense to a felony.88 
In this area, it appears that the military is holding its personnel to a much 
higher standard than the rest of the country.  Moreover, even if the highest
punishment is not meted out when the servicemember is formally
charged with adultery, the offense still appears in the servicemember’s 
permanent military record with a negative annotation.89  This type of  
mark on a servicemember’s record could effectively end a military
career by making promotion impossible.90 
When charged with an offense, a servicemember’s commanding officer 
often has discretion as to whether to punish the offense by court-martial 
or by nonjudicial punishment.91  Nonjudicial punishment is a disciplinary 
measure that is less serious than a trial by court-martial but more serious 
than administrative corrective measures.92  Normally, a nonjudicial
85. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice 
Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1523–24 (2000).  Friedman, while discussing 
how adultery is rarely used as a ground for divorce, notes that in the states where
adultery is still a crime, the statutes are rarely enforced, and adultery is not even treated
as a crime. See id.; see also supra note 28. 
86. See Melissa Ash Haggard, Note, Adultery: A Comparison of Military Law and 
State Law and the Controversy This Causes Under Our Constitution and Criminal 
Justice System, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 469, 473, 476–77 (1998).  Haggard states that even 
though adultery is still a crime in less than half of the states, it is seldom enforced or
prosecuted, while the military prosecutes adultery more zealously and at a much higher 
rate than the civilian world. See id.
 87. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501 (LexisNexis 2002). 
 88. MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 62(e).  Because the maximum punishment
includes a dishonorable discharge, an adultery conviction may be interpreted by some
state laws as the equivalent of a felony.  See infra notes 259–60 and accompanying text. 
89. See Esquivel, supra note 56, at 855; see also infra notes 91–94 and
accompanying text.
90. See Esquivel, supra note 56, at 855; see also infra notes 259–63 and 
accompanying text.
91. MCM, supra note 13, pt. V, ¶ 1(d)(2).  Nonjudicial punishment is a means for 
commanders to regulate and punish the behavior of the members of their unit promptly
and without the stigma of a court-martial conviction. See id. at pt. V, ¶ 1(c). 
92. Id. at pt. V, ¶ 1(b).  The MCM gives the commander of a unit discretion in
determining when to use nonjudicial punishment.  When considering which type of 
punishment is appropriate, commanders should consider “the nature of the offense, the 
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punishment may only be pursued for a minor offense, and an offense is 
generally minor when the maximum punishment would not include a 
dishonorable discharge or confinement for longer than one year.93 
Accordingly, adultery would not usually qualify as a minor offense because 
it may result in a dishonorable discharge,94 and therefore it should be
tried by court-martial without the option for the lesser nonjudicial 
punishment.
The other method to punish an offense in the military is by court-
martial.  Courts-martial may try any offense under the UCMJ and the 
laws of war to the extent permitted by the Constitution95 and may try any 
person subject to the UCMJ.96  This includes active duty military personnel,
certain retired personnel, certain reservist personnel, and civilians who
accompany the military on contingency operations.97 
There are three types of courts-martial: summary, special, and general.98 
Out of the three types of courts-martial, the general court-martial is the 
record of the servicemember, the needs for good order and discipline, and the effect of
nonjudicial punishment on the servicemember and the servicemember’s record.” See id. 
pt. V, ¶ 1(d)(1).  Examples of nonjudicial punishment include restriction, forfeiture of 
pay, or reduction in rank.  See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 
(2006). 
 93. MCM, supra note 13, pt. V, ¶ 1(e).  Whether an offense is minor depends on
several factors, including the offender’s age, rank, experience, and the maximum 
sentence allowed for the offense if tried by court-martial. Id.
94. Id.; see id. pt. IV, ¶ 62(e) (listing the maximum punishment for adultery as 
“[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 
[one] year”).  Despite the language of the MCM, however, adultery has been disposed of 
by nonjudicial punishment before and presumably still qualifies for this special type of 
punishment.  See Benjamin G. Davis, Refluat Stercus: A Citizen’s View of Criminal 
Prosecution in U.S. Domestic Courts of High-Level U.S. Civilian Authority and Military 
Generals for Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 503, 549 n.135 (2008) (“Of 244 cases since 1999 involving . . . adultery . .
. the majority—89 per cent—were disposed of with non-judicial punishment.”).
 95. MCM, supra note 13, pt. II, r. 203.  The jurisdiction of a court-martial is not 
affected by the place where the court-martial sits. Id. pt. II, r. 201(a)(3).  This means that 
a court-martial may convene onboard a ship in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, and the 
UCMJ would still govern. See Gasper, supra note 46, at 163. 
 96. MCM, supra note 13, pt. II, r. 202(a). 
97. Id. pt. II, r. 202(a) discussion; see also supra note 59. 
 98. MCM, supra note 13, pt. II, r. 201(f).  A summary court-martial exists 
primarily as a way to “promptly adjudicate minor offenses under a simple procedure.”  
Id. pt. II, r. 1301(b).  The maximum penalty that can be imposed by a summary court-
martial is confinement for thirty days. Id. pt. II, r. 1301(d)(1).  As stated previously, 
adultery should not qualify as a minor offense because the maximum penalty includes a
dishonorable discharge.  But see supra note 94 (explaining how the determination of 
whether an offense is minor depends on a number of factors).  Special courts-martial 
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most serious forum and also the most similar to a civilian court.99 Any 
offense and any punishment under the UCMJ has the potential to be tried 
and adjudged in a general court-martial, though this forum is usually
reserved for the most serious crimes.100 
Due to the severity of its maximum punishment,101 adultery is considered
more serious than a minor offense and thus must be tried by a special or
general court-martial.102  In order to convict a servicemember of adultery at
a court-martial, however, the MCM requires that the government prove 
more than just an indiscretion.103 
IV. HOW THE PROSECUTION PROVES ADULTERY UNDER 
ARTICLES 133 AND 134 
The MCM lists the crime of adultery under article 134.104  To establish 
this crime, the military must prove three elements:
(1) That the accused wrongfully had sexual intercourse with a certain person; 
(2) That, at the time, the accused or the other person was married to someone 
else; and
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.105 
may try anyone subject to the UCMJ for any noncapital offense under the UCMJ.
MCM, supra note 13, pt. II, r. 201(f)(2).  A capital offense is an offense for which death 
is a possible punishment.  Id. pt. II, r. 103(3).  These courts are also limited in the penalty
they can give in that a special court-martial may provide any punishment except for the 
most serious penalties, such as death, dishonorable discharge, or dismissal.  Id. pt. II, 
r. 201(f)(2)(B)(i). 
99. See Gasper, supra note 46, at 163–64.  The general court-martial is similar to a 
civilian court in that it includes a judge and at least five members—who resemble
something close to a civilian jury—appointed by military authorities to try a designated 
case or series of cases. See id. 
 100. MCM, supra note 13, pt. II, r. 201(f); Liewer, supra note 3 (referring to
general court-martial as typically reserved for serious felonies).  Usually, a general court-
martial consists of a military judge and not less than five members.  MCM, supra note 
13, pt. II, r. 501(a); see also supra note 99.  For noncapital offenses, however, the 
accused may request a general court-martial that consists of only one judge.  MCM, 
supra note 13, pt. II, r. 903(a)(2).  For both general and special courts-martial, the 
accused is entitled to defense counsel. Id. pt. II, r. 501(b). 
101. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
102. See MCM, supra note 13, pt. II, r. 1301(b); id. pt. V, ¶ 1(e).  But see supra
note 94 (explaining that adultery has often been disposed of by nonjudicial punishment). 
103. See infra Part IV. 
 104. MCM, supra note 13; see Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 134, 10 U.S.C.
§ 934 (2006); supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 105. MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 62(b)(1)–(3). 
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For officers, the government may also charge adultery under article 
133, the only difference being that in place of the third element, the 
prosecution must prove that the conduct “constituted conduct unbecoming 
an officer and a gentleman.”106 
A.  The Offense of Adultery Under Article 134 
To be found guilty of adultery under article 134, the prosecution must
not only prove that adultery took place but also that the conduct was 
prejudicial to good order and discipline or was of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces.107  The MCM explains prejudice as 
conduct that has “an obvious, and measurably divisive effect on unit or
organization discipline, morale, or cohesion, or is clearly detrimental to
the authority or . . . respect toward a servicemember.”108  It further
stipulates that, in order to qualify as behavior that discredits the service,
the conduct must be sufficiently open or notorious in nature “to bring the
service into disrepute . . . or lower it in public esteem.”109  The MCM 
makes clear that private adulterous conduct may be found by a court to
be prejudicial to good order and discipline, but it does not explain 
how.110 
To assist a military judge or commanding officer in determining 
whether the adulterous conduct is prejudicial to good order and discipline or
is of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, the MCM
provides a list of eight factors to consider: (1) the accused’s and the
coactor’s marital status and rank or relationship to the Armed Forces; 
(2) the military status or relationship to the military of the accused or
coactor’s spouse; (3) the impact of the relationship on either’s
performance in the military; (4) the misuse of government time or
resources to facilitate the relationship; (5) whether the conduct persisted 
despite orders to desist, “the flagrancy of the conduct,” and whether the 
adultery was accompanied by other UCMJ violations; (6) the negative 
106. Id. pt. IV, ¶ 59(b)(2); see Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 133, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 933 (2006); see also infra Part IV.B.
 107. MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 62(b)(3). 
108. Id. pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2). 
109. Id.
110. The text of the MCM states: “While adulterous conduct that is private and 
discreet in nature may not be service discrediting . . . under the circumstances, it may be 
determined to be conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.”  Id.
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impact of the conduct on the units of the accused, the coactor, or the 
spouses of either; (7) whether the accused or coactor were legally
separated; (8) whether the adultery was an ongoing relationship or more 
remote in time.111  These factors, added to the MCM in 2002, are just
that—factors.112  Even though the addition of these factors demonstrates
a desire by the military to limit the circumstances of adultery that merit a 
judicial intervention, they have not yet been effective at stopping the 
arbitrary prosecution of adultery in the military.113 They are not 
additional elements that the prosecution must prove but only issues that 
the court may consider when determining whether the conduct was 
sufficiently detrimental to good order and discipline or to the reputation 
of the armed services.114  The court-martial is still free to convict for
adulterous conduct that meets only a few of these factors or even none of 
them, as long as the court decides that the conduct was in some way
prejudicial or discrediting to the service. 
111. Id. pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2)(a)–(i).
112. Exec. Order No. 13,262, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,773 (Apr. 11, 2002).  The U.S. Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals discussed these factors in detail in United 
States v. Orellana, while determining whether the right to privacy as defined in
Lawrence v. Texas applied to the military’s proscription of adultery.  See United States
v. Orellana, 62 M.J. 595, 599–601 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2005).  The court found that, in 
light of the application of the factors, the appellant’s conduct was prejudicial to good
order and discipline as well as service discrediting, and as a result, the conduct was 
removed from the protection of the Constitution.  See id. at 600–01.  Other recent 
decisions contain little to no discussion of the factors in determining whether the 
adultery was sufficiently service discrediting or prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v.
Velazquez, NMCCA 200602421, 2007 WL 2340612, at *6 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 
16, 2007).  The addition of these factors also helps promulgate the purported view of
Congress that article 134 is not meant “to regulate . . . wholly private moral conduct.” 
United States v. Hickson, 22 M.J. 146, 149 (C.M.A. 1986), overruled on other grounds 
by United States v. Hill, 48 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (quoting United States v. Snyder, 
4 C.M.R. 15, 19 (C.M.A. 1952)).
113. This statement takes into account the recent prosecutions of Penland and Yee.
See supra notes 2–12 and accompanying text. 
114. This is apparent from the fact that these factors are not included in the 
elements but listed in the accompanying discussion of the offense as relevant
circumstances to help determine whether the conduct was prejudicial to good order and 
discipline or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the service. See MCM, supra note 
13, pt. IV, ¶ 62(b)–(c)(2). 
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1.  Prejudicial to Good Order and Discipline 
The language of the MCM makes clear that, in order for adulterous 
conduct to merit a prosecution under the prejudice prong, it must be
directly prejudicial to good order and discipline.115  This means the
conduct must have some measurable effect “on unit or organization
discipline, morale, or cohesion, or is clearly detrimental to the authority 
or stature of or respect toward a servicemember.”116 
The court-martial in United States v. Johnson reflected these same
sentiments, stating that article 134 prosecutions are “confined to cases in 
which the prejudice is reasonably direct and palpable.”117  This same  
court, however, held that “offenses involving moral turpitude are inherently
prejudicial or discrediting” to the service but failed to supply an exact 
definition of what constitutes moral turpitude.118  Many courts-martial 
using this same language have found that conduct involving moral 
turpitude is inherently prejudicial, consequently allowing the prosecution
to fulfill its burden of proving this essential prong just by alleging that
the conduct of the accused was immoral.119  A definition of moral
turpitude based on court-martial case law, however, is hard to come
by.120 
 115. MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2). 
116. Id.; see also United States v. Johnson, 39 M.J. 1033, 1037 (A.C.M.R. 1994) 
(“Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline refers only to acts directly
prejudicial to good order and discipline and not to acts which are prejudicial only in a 
remote or indirect sense.”). 
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1038 (emphasis added). 
119. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 34 M.J. 713, 714 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (“‘Some
acts by their very nature are prejudicial to good order and discipline . . . .  They generally
are offenses that involve a degree of moral turpitude.’” (quoting United States v. Light, 
36 C.M.R. 579, 584 (A.B.R. 1965))). 
120. The court-martial decisions that have used the language of moral turpitude 
offer no discernable pattern to help predict which conduct will be defined as immoral. 
The U.S Army Board of Review in United States v. Hunt, for example, found that negligent 
homicide was not immoral, see United States v. Hunt, 27 C.M.R. 557, 559 (A.B.R. 
1958), while finding less than ten years later in United States v. Light that accepting a 
bribe was immoral, see Light, 36 C.M.R. at 584.  The phrase “moral turpitude” is not 
unique to military law, however, and has also been used in civilian statutes. See, e.g.,
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226 (1985).  In Hunter, the Supreme Court 
explained that the Alabama Supreme Court’s interpretation of moral turpitude was an act 
that was “‘immoral in itself, regardless of the fact whether it is punishable by law.  The
doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes, the moral turpitude.’”  See 
id. (quoting Pippin v. State, 73 So. 340, 342 (Ala. 1916)). Like the language in the 
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The absence of a clear definition of immoral conduct could be 
explained in many ways.  First, there are presumably hundreds of 
punishable acts that a judge could find to be morally reprehensible, and 
it would be nearly impossible to list them all.  Second, when courts have 
attempted to define conduct involving moral turpitude, they often resort 
to listing examples of immoral conduct rather than endeavoring to 
describe what actually makes conduct morally wrong.121  Because of
this, no discernable pattern emerges in case law from which one could 
predict what the court will deem as immoral and what will require 
additional proof that the conduct is prejudicial.122  For example, the court 
in United States v. Light stated that accepting a bribe and cheating were
examples of immoral conduct, whereas borrowing money from a 
subordinate was an acceptable act.123  By contrast, in United States v.
Hunt, the court found that negligent homicide did not involve moral 
turpitude because it was a misdemeanor under the local civilian law.124 
Furthermore, even when the courts-martial have addressed the same
conduct, they still have not agreed on whether it is immoral. This is 
exemplified by the courts’ treatment of false swearing.125  The court in 
United States v. Greene stated that false swearing is an offense that 
involves a degree of moral turpitude,126 whereas the court in United 
States v. Johnson stated that lying may be dishonest but is not “per se 
wrongful or discreditable.”127 
All of these cases illustrate the problem with basing punishment on 
morality: morality is intrinsically subjective.  This is especially problematic 
court-martial decisions, this definition of moral turpitude is also vague, demonstrating 
that this problem of predictability follows the phrase moral turpitude regardless of where 
it appears.  In Hunter, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a provision of
the Alabama Constitution that disenfranchised any person convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude.  See id. at 233. 
121. For instance, the U.S. Army Board of Review in United States v. Light listed
examples of conduct involving moral turpitude: “Examples are where a sergeant accepts 
money from a member of his platoon as compensation for a pass, wrongfully receiving 
money as compensation for transporting a Korean female in a Government vehicle, 
cheating on an examination, [and] receiving money for calling false numbers at a bingo 
game.”  36 C.M.R. at 584 (citations omitted).
122. See supra note 120. 
123. Light, 36 C.M.R. at 584.
124. See Hunt, 27 C.M.R. at 559–60.  Using this court’s definition, adultery would
not involve moral turpitude because in many states it is a misdemeanor.  See supra note 
41 and accompanying text. 
125. Two decisions that discuss false swearing are United States v. Greene, 34 M.J.
713, 714 (A.C.M.R. 1992), and United States v. Johnson, 39 M.J. 1033, 1038 (A.C.M.R. 
1994). 
126. Greene, 34 M.J. at 714. 
127. Johnson, 39 M.J. at 1038. 
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for adultery, a type of conduct defined from the beginning of American
jurisprudence by its immoral character.128  Even though recent decisions
have defined adultery as not involving moral turpitude and thus not 
inherently prejudicial,129 the U.S. Navy Court of Military Review in
United States v. Ambalada declared that adultery was an offense against 
the morals of society.130  This inconsistency is troubling, given that a
finding that adultery is immoral automatically makes the act prejudicial 
to good order and discipline, thus significantly relieving the government’s 
burden of proof in establishing the crime of adultery under article 134
and essentially eliminating the necessity of the factors.131  This might  
also provide an explanation as to why, in some cases, the court has not 
required much in the way of proof of the prejudicial effect of the
adultery, suggesting that it has instead relied on its own private finding
that adultery is immoral and thus inherently prejudicial.132 
128. See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text. 
129. See, e.g., United States v. Poole, 39 M.J. 819, 821 (A.C.M.R. 1994) (“[N]ot 
only must the government prove the existence of a valid marriage and an act of sexual
intercourse with another by one of the parties to the marriage, but also that the act of sexual
intercourse constituted conduct that was prejudicial to good order and discipline.”);
United States v. Perez, 33 M.J. 1050, 1054 (A.C.M.R. 1991) (“We are not prepared to
state a per se rule that sexual intercourse with a person not his or her spouse by a married
soldier under any circumstance constitutes the offense of adultery under Article 134, 
UCMJ.”).
130. United States v. Ambalada, 1 M.J. 1132, 1137 (N.C.M.R. 1977).  The court 
made this statement in an effort to clarify that adultery is not an offense against the
person of one of the participants and thus cannot be included as a lesser charge within a 
charge of rape. See id.
131. See Johnson, 39 M.J. at 1038 (“Generally, offenses involving moral turpitude
are inherently prejudicial.”).  For a discussion of the factors used by courts-martial to
help determine whether the adultery was prejudicial, see supra notes 111–12 and 
accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Velazquez, NMCCA 200602421, 2007 WL 2340612, at
*6 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2007).  In Velazquez, the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals accepted a statement by the appellant, admitting that his
conduct was prejudicial “because others knew about the adultery” and it “generated 
some notoriety in a foreign country” as sufficient proof that the adultery was prejudicial. 
See id. This does not seem to comply with the MCM’s requirement that there be some
measurable effect to find the conduct prejudicial to good order or discipline.  See supra
note 116.  In addition, in United States v. Greene, the U.S. Army Court of Military
Review noted that it is not necessary for the accused to explain how his offense was 
prejudicial to good order and discipline or was service discrediting, but only that he 
admit that the conduct was prejudicial or service discrediting, again demonstrating the 
lack of initiative by the court to find some measurable effect of the conduct.  34 M.J.
713, 714 (A.C.M.R. 1992). 
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2.  Discrediting to the Military 
The MCM allows the prosecution an alternative way to prove the
damaging effect of an adulterous act—by proving that the act had a 
tendency to discredit the armed services.133  The MCM describes discredit
as meaning “to injure the reputation of the armed forces and includes 
adulterous conduct that has a tendency, because of its open or notorious
nature, to bring the service into disrepute, make it subject to public ridicule, 
or lower it in public esteem.”134  The very language of the MCM states 
that the prosecution does not need to prove any actual damage to the 
service’s reputation but only that the conduct had the tendency to
produce that damage.135 
By not requiring the prosecution to prove any definitive damage to the 
military’s reputation, this element becomes relatively easy to satisfy. 
The court in United States v. Velazquez found that because others were
aware of the adultery, it was sufficiently service discrediting.136  The  
court did not require any proof that this knowledge led to a condemnation of
the service or the servicemember, only that outside knowledge of the
conduct existed.137  This type of logic assumes that anyone who knows
about adulterous conduct automatically disapproves of both the act and 
the entire organization associated with the adulterer, and consequently
this knowledge brings the entire military into disrepute.  Based on the 
evident disapproval of criminal prosecutions for adultery in the civilian 
world, it does not seem to fit that prosecuting adulterers is the way to 
win the approval of the American public.138  In any case, the Velasquez
decision demonstrates that any proof of knowledge of the affair is sufficient 
to find the conduct as tending to discredit the armed services.139 
Disagreement has arisen among the courts, however, on whether proof 
of awareness of the conduct is necessary to prove a tendency to damage 
the service’s reputation.  One line of decisions states that civilians must
be aware of the behavior and military status of the offender in order to 
133. See MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2). 
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also United States v. Mead, 63 M.J. 724, 728 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 
2006) (“Article 134, UCMJ, does not require direct injury.”). 
136. See Velazquez, 2007 WL 2340612, at *6.  In Velazquez, the appellant admitted 
his conduct was service discrediting because others knew about the adultery. Id.
137. See id.
138. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text; see also United States v. 
Green, 39 M.J. 606, 609 (A.C.M.R. 1994) (“Indeed, it is our sense that imposition of 
punishment for adultery has become alien to the civilian’s concept of criminal law.”). 
139. See Velazquez, 2007 WL 2340612, at *6. 
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establish that the conduct is service discrediting.140 United States v. 
Perez represents this view.141  In Perez, the court held that the government 
did not meet its burden of proving that the defendant’s adultery was 
prejudicial to good order and discipline.142  Furthermore, the court found
that because the government did not show that civilians knew about the 
affair, the conduct was not of a nature to bring discredit on the armed
forces.143  This paradigm seems logical.  In order for the actions of one
servicemember to tend to cause the public to look down on the entire 
military, there reasonably must be some public awareness of this conduct. 
Another line of cases exists, however, that does not require any
notoriety to find that the conduct had a tendency to bring the service into
disrepute.144  In United States v. Mead, for example, the court emphasized 
the language of the MCM by pointing out that the court was only
concerned with conduct that was “of a nature to bring discredit upon the 
armed forces because of its tendency to bring the service into disrepute 
or lower it in public esteem.”145  Based on this language, the court found 
there was no requirement that the public be aware of the conduct or the 
accused’s military status in order to establish the conduct as tending to 
bring the service into disrepute.146  Similarly, in United States v. Nygren, 
the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, when presented with the 
argument that the public must be aware of the appellant’s underage
drinking in order for it to tend to bring the service into disrepute, stated
that it knew of “no binding authority to that effect” and believed “the 
140. See, e.g., Green, 39 M.J. at 609 (“[T]o prove service discrediting conduct, the 
public must be aware of the behavior and the military status of the offender.”); United
States v. Perez, 33 M.J. 1050, 1054 (A.C.M.R. 1991) (“Civilians must be aware of the 
behavior and the military status of the offender.  Open and notorious conduct may be 
service discrediting, while wholly private conduct is not generally service discrediting.” 
(citations omitted)).
141. Perez, 33 M.J. at 1054. 
142. Id.
143. See id.  The Perez court also found that there was no evidence that the alleged
adultery in this case offended local law or community standards, even though the court 
pointed out that adultery still is a criminal offense in Massachusetts.  See id. at 1054 & 
n.3. 
144. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, ACM 36695, 2007 WL 4259582, at *3 (A.F. 
Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 16, 2007), vacated, United States v. Brown, 67 M.J. 176 (C.A.A.F.
2008); United States v. Mead, 63 M.J. 724, 729 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2006). 
145. Mead, 63 M.J. at 729. 
146. See id.
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contrary [was] true.”147  Admittedly, the cases in Mead and Nygren dealt 
with prosecutions under the general offense of article 134, for possessing
child pornography148 and for underage consumption of alcoholic
beverages,149 respectively, and not a specific enumerated offense under
article 134, like adultery. Thus, the cases that specifically require public
awareness of adultery to find the conduct discrediting to the service may
be controlling on this issue.150  Regardless, this disagreement among the
courts creates uncertainty about what facts the prosecution must establish to
prove this element, allowing the court to give the prosecution leeway
when it deems the conduct immoral. 
Even with the two separate approaches to proving that the adultery is
damaging enough to justify a criminal prosecution under article 134, in
reality, the courts-martial often view these approaches as one and the 
same and discuss the two elements interchangeably.151  By not requiring
any specific showing of fact for these two disparate elements, the courts-
martial give the prosecution great latitude to prove them both.  This
147. United States v. Nygren, 53 M.J. 716, 718 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2000).  The 
court explained that article 134 criminalizes all conduct that is of a nature to bring the 
service into disrepute and all conduct that tends to lower the service in the public esteem, 
and therefore the statute did not require any proof of awareness of the appellant’s 
military status. See id. The court also emphasized that at his providence inquiry—a
hearing at which the military judge inquires into the soundness of the accused’s guilty
plea—the appellant had stipulated that he believed his conduct was of a nature to bring 
discredit to the armed forces, perhaps explaining why the court did not find further 
evidence of the service discrediting nature of his conduct necessary. See id.
148. Mead, 63 M.J. at 725. 
149. Nygren, 53 M.J. at 716–17. 
150. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 39 M.J. 606, 609 (A.C.M.R. 1994); United 
States v. Perez, 33 M.J. 1050, 1054 (A.C.M.R. 1991).  The current offense of adultery, 
last amended in 2002, specifies that adulterous conduct that is private and discreet in 
nature may not be service discrediting. See MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 62(c)(2);
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV, ¶ 62(c) (2000 ed.), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-2000.pdf (giving a limited explanation of
the crime of adultery prior to the 2002 amendments). Still, the courts have not specifically
stated that an adultery prosecution has special rules for proving it is discrediting to the 
service, so the prosecution could cite to either line of cases when presenting its case and 
could potentially not have to show any public awareness or public disapproval of the 
adultery to prove that it is service discrediting. 
151. See, e.g., United States v. Velazquez, NMCCA 200602421, 2007 WL
2340612, at *6 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2007) (“The appellant admitted during
providence that his conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline and was service 
discrediting because others knew about the adultery, it became a topic of discussion, and
generated some notoriety in a foreign country.”); United States v. Johnson, 39 M.J. 1033, 
1038 (A.C.M.R. 1994) (“[O]ffenses involving moral turpitude are inherently prejudicial 
or discrediting.”); United States v. Collier, 36 M.J. 501, 512 (A.F.C.M.R. 1992) (“That 
his conduct supplied such a powerful incentive to commit another crime surely makes it 
discrediting to the service and prejudicial to good order.”). 
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tends to suggest that the court will apply its own imprecise standard on a 
case-by-case basis, thereby providing no predictability as to which
adulterous conduct will actually violate article 134.152 
B.  Prosecuting Adultery Under Article 133 
An officer may also be convicted of adultery under article 133.153 
This article, unlike article 134, applies only to commissioned officers, 
cadets, and midshipmen in the armed services.154  To present a successful 
case under article 133, the prosecution only needs to prove that the 
individual officer committed the predicate acts and that those acts, under 
the circumstances, “constituted conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman.”155 When an officer is charged with a crime already included 
under other articles, such as adultery, the burden of proof for conviction 
under article 133 is distinct, requiring, in addition to elements of proof 
under the other offense, that the conduct constitutes unbecoming 
conduct.156  Consequently, no matter the charge, the appropriate standard
152. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
153. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2006).  The 
prosecution of Lieutenant Commander Penland is an example of an article 133 adultery
prosecution. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
 154. MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 59(a). 
155. Id. pt. IV, ¶ 59(b).  Note that the word gentleman includes both males and 
females.  See id. pt. IV, ¶ 59(c)(1).  When Congress first implemented the UCMJ and
article 133 in 1951, it utilized the word gentleman of the old Article of War 95, even 
though more than 350,000 women served in the military during World War II. See Hillman,
supra note 71, at 43.  For further discussion on how applying the word gentleman to 
women in the military is confusing and at times preposterous, see id. at 43–47. 
 156. MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 59(c)(2).  Some decisions suggest that the only
burden of proof for an article 133 conviction, whether or not the conduct is already a 
crime under a separate article, is whether it amounted to conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman.  See, e.g., United States v. Giordano, 35 C.M.R. 135, 140 (C.M.A. 
1964) (“[I]t is evident that the essence of an Article 133 offense is not whether an
accused officer’s conduct otherwise amounts to an offense . . . but simply whether the 
acts meet the standard of conduct unbecoming an officer . . . .”).  Based on the language 
of the most current MCM, however, it is clear that an officer may be convicted under
article 133 of a crime that is codified under another article only if the prosecution meets 
the same burden of proof required under the other article and demonstrates that the 
conduct amounted to conduct unbecoming.  See MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 59(c)(2); 
see also United States v. Frelix-Vann, 55 M.J. 329, 331 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (recognizing
that when another crime is “alleged as the sole basis for the unbecoming an officer
specification,” the MCM now dictates that the elements of the underlying offense are 
“required elements of the conduct unbecoming offense”). 
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for conviction is whether the conduct is dishonorable enough to constitute 
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.157 
The explanation in the MCM provides that every officer must have 
certain moral attributes, but it does not spell out what these attributes 
are.158  It further explains that an officer who lacks the expected level of 
morality exhibits this by “acts of dishonesty, unfair dealing, indecency, 
indecorum, lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty.”159  It goes on to provide a
list of examples that would constitute conduct unbecoming an officer, 
including cheating on an exam, public association with known prostitutes, 
failing to support the servicemember’s family without good cause, and
committing any crime involving moral turpitude.160 
The type of conduct that amounts to unbecoming conduct is further 
described by the MCM as any acts in an official capacity that compromise
the officer’s character and any acts in an unofficial capacity that
compromise his standing as an officer.161  Stated more succinctly, conduct
unbecoming includes any behavior at work that reflects badly on one’s 
personal character or any behavior at home that indicates an officer is
professionally incompetent.162  Thus, article 133 regulates both public
and private conduct.
Article 133 focuses on how the conduct reflects upon the officer not 
only as an individual but also as a representative of the armed services.163 
First, an officer, unlike most enlisted servicemembers, is in a position of 
power over many.164  As a result, in order for the military institution of
chain of command165 to function properly, the officer must command
157. See supra note 156. 
158. See MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 59(c)(2) (“There are certain moral attributes
common to the ideal officer and the perfect gentleman . . . .”).
159. Id.
160. Id. pt. IV, ¶ 59(c)(3).  See supra notes 118–32 and accompanying text for a
discussion on how the military courts have treated crimes involving moral turpitude. 
 161. MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 59(c)(2). 
162. See Hopkins, supra note 30, at 214 (describing a “symbiotic relationship” 
between the public and private conduct of the officer).
163. See id. at 213–14. 
164. See United States v. Means, 10 M.J. 162, 165–66 (C.M.A. 1981) (explaining
that officers have special privileges and hold special positions of honor, so it is not
unreasonable to hold them to a higher level of accountability); see also SCHLUETER,
supra note 72, § 2-5 (“[A]ll military systems place special responsibilities and status
upon officers.”).
 165. See Hopkins, supra note 30, at 224, for an explanation of the chain of command. 
Hopkins explains: 
A military force is a well-greased, unified machine that operates under a clear 
line of authority.  Through this hierarchical structure, the overall military strategic 
plan comes to fruition.  For this to work, individual actors cannot unilaterally 
decide to stop spinning, but must turn synchronously on the order of the driver.  
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respect from his subordinates.  Otherwise, the military is not operating 
as a single force because one of the links in the chain is weakened.166 
An officer who lacks the complete respect of lower-ranked servicemembers 
in his unit faces the possibility that his orders will be questioned or
disobeyed.167  Once any disobedience begins, the entire unit’s structure, 
and consequently the entire military operation, is in jeopardy.168  Second, 
an officer also acts as a representative of the military to the public,169 
and those perceived to be untrustworthy undermine the legitimacy of the
armed services to the public.170  Officers are centrally and very publicly 
involved in the primary functions of the military, including transforming 
civilians into soldiers and directing the military’s operations here and
abroad.171  Owing to an officer’s important role as a leader in the military, 
the civilian perception of an individual officer’s conduct in theory 
becomes the perception of the entire military itself.172 
Based on these rationales for article 133, it would seem that in order to
justify an article 133 prosecution of adultery, the court should find that 
the conduct either undermined the officer’s ability to command her unit 
or undermined the public confidence in the officer.  The standard under 
this article, however, is not so clear.  In fact, the actual standard for 
If a military force is to operate effectively . . . it must function as a single force
such that one branch, unit, or individual does not act in a manner that 
undercuts the work of another branch or unit.  They must all be working
towards the same ultimate end, under the orchestration . . . of the Commander-
in-Chief.
Id. (footnote omitted).
166. See id. at 224–25. 
167. See Winner, supra note 23, at 1103 (“[A]dultery undermines a soldier’s ‘moral
beacon’ image that is vital to commanding the respect of peers and subordinates in
critical situations.”).
168. See Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 57 
(2002) (explaining the important role officers play in maintaining the system of the chain
of command, a system on which the military heavily relies); see also supra note 165. 
169. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Military Appeals,
supra note 78, at *11–12 (quoting WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS
711–12 (2d ed. 1920)) (stating that an officer represents the military profession). 
170. See Winner, supra note 23, at 1105–06 (explaining how the Navy Tailhook sex 
scandal involving more than 100 Navy and Marine Corps officers deeply scarred the 
professional reputation of the Navy and the entire military).
171. See Hillman, supra note 71, at 8. 
172. See id. at 8–9 (“[T]he ‘officer subculture’ dominates civilian perceptions of 
military society because of officers’ public leadership roles, longevity in the service, and 
strong connections to American society.”). 
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determining which conduct is unbecoming is exceedingly and purposefully 
173vague. 
The phrase “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen” is 
language that originated in British military law and was later borrowed
by the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War to advertise the 
“gentility of officers.”174  The first “conduct unbecoming” offense in
America appeared in the Massachusetts Articles of War in 1775,175 and 
the crime remains today as a codified statute in the UCMJ.176  The  
language itself does not reveal which conduct specifically is unbecoming 
and thus criminal.  This vagueness allows the standard to mold itself
according to the prevailing standard of what is proper and moral.177  As a
result, the development of “conduct unbecoming” over time reflects the 
cultural changes in the American military by revealing what conduct has 
been determined to be improper for an officer and thus subject to criminal 
prosecution.178 The introduction of women into the armed forces posed
challenges to the article, as it is defined by the notion of officers as
gentlemen and not gentlewomen.179  And even though officers’ sexual 
improprieties have long been subject to prosecution as conduct 
173. See Keithe E. Nelson, Conduct Expected of an Officer and a Gentleman: An
Ambiguity, 12 A.F. JAG L. REV. 124, 124–25 (1970) (describing the inherent ambiguity
of article 133 as purposeful in order to encompass the many moral attributes expected of
an officer).
 174. Hillman, supra note 71, at 10. 
 175. Nelson, supra note 173, at 127. 
176. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2006). 
177. See Hopkins, supra note 30, at 223 (describing the doctrinal ambiguity of
article 133); Nelson, supra note 173, at 137 (“The customs of the community which 
shaped the common law through its development and finally resulted in the written 
statutes found in many jurisdictions also shaped the military articles.”).  The vagueness 
of article 133 was challenged to be unconstitutional in United States v. Lee, 4 C.M.R. 
185, 189 (A.B.R. 1952), and again up to the Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 752 (1974).  The court in Lee found the article was not unconstitutional because the 
language of conduct unbecoming had been long accepted as applied to the military.  See 
Lee, 4 C.M.R. at 189–90.  The Court in Parker came to a similar conclusion, holding that 
there was a strong presumption of validity that attached to an act of Congress, such as 
the UCMJ, and that statutes are not automatically invalidated simply because it may be
difficult to determine whether marginal offenses fall within their scope.  Parker, 417
U.S. at 756–57.  This same type of reasoning has also been utilized to explain any
ambiguity challenges to all of the general articles, such as article 133.  See Nelson, supra
note 173, at 137.  For an in-depth discussion of the doctrine of military deference, see
generally John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 
35 GA. L. REV. 161 (2000). 
178. See Hillman, supra note 71, at 7 (“The strategic vagueness of ‘conduct 
unbecoming’ . . . makes this peculiar statute a telling register of social conflict, cultural
change, and military evolution.”). 
179. See id. at 10; see also supra note 155. 
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unbecoming, controlling the sexuality of officers seems to have become 
the recent primary goal of article 133 prosecutions.180 
Because of the introduction of subjective issues, like morality and 
character, into the analysis of whether adulterous conduct qualifies as 
unbecoming, a prosecution under this article is subject to the same pitfalls as
article 134, namely that the results can be unpredictable and invariably tied
to the personal beliefs of the courts.181  For instance, in United States v.
Guaglione, the court found that an officer who visited a brothel, but did
not engage in sexual acts there, did not commit conduct unbecoming.182 
The court justified this finding by explaining that his conduct was lawful 
according to the prevailing morals of the Frankfurt, Germany community, 
where the conduct took place.183  Compare this result to United States v.
Jenkins, where the court found that the officer did engage in conduct
unbecoming by negligently writing bad checks, holding that these acts 
were disgraceful to him personally and “compromised his standing as an
officer.”184 
Based solely on the definition of “conduct unbecoming” in case law,
an officer’s extramarital affair may be unbecoming for an article 133 
conviction, even though it is wholly private.185  Moreover, unlike article 
134, the court-martial does not need to engage in any kind of analysis as 
180. See Hillman, supra note 71, at 10.  For examples of recent article 133 prosecutions 
that focused on regulating the sexual behavior of officers, see Sutton v. United States, 65 
Fed. Cl. 800, 803 (2005) (adultery prosecution); Kindred v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 
106, 108 (1998) (discharge for homosexual conduct).  See also supra notes 2–6 and 
accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
182. See United States v. Guaglione, 27 M.J. 268, 272–73 (C.M.A. 1988).  In 
Guaglione, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals also recognized that “an officer’s conduct
may be ‘unbecoming’ for purposes of Article 133 even though it is private,” demonstrating
that wholly private conduct may be regulated under this article with no required showing 
of public awareness.  Id. at 272. 
183. Id.
184. United States v. Jenkins, 39 M.J. 843, 846 (A.C.M.R. 1994).  The different 
results in Jenkins and Guaglione may be explained by a common interpretation of moral 
turpitude as crimes that involve some sort of fraud or deceit. See Jordan v. De George, 
341 U.S. 223, 228 (1951) (“[C]rimes involving fraud have universally been held to 
involve moral turpitude.”).  However, it is unclear whether military courts have ever
adopted this definition of moral turpitude because a clear definition of moral turpitude is 
difficult to locate within a military court opinion.  See supra notes 118–20 and
accompanying text.  For further discussion on the vexing ambiguity of the phrase “moral 
turpitude,” see Joseph G. Jarret, Of Morals, Mores & Malt Liquor: Denying Beer
Permits Based on Moral Turpitude, TENN. B.J., Dec. 2009, at 26, 26–27. 
185. See supra note 182. 
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to the damaging effects of the affair but needs only to determine for
itself whether the adultery amounted to conduct unbecoming.  This is 
due to the inherently subjective nature of the definition of conduct
unbecoming.186  As the U.S. Army Court of Military Review stated, “It
is unnecessary that the conduct amount to an offense otherwise, but ‘it
must offend so seriously against law, justice, morality or decorum, as to
expose to disgrace, socially, or as a man . . . .’”187  By not listing any 
specific standards in the statute, the method and the decision as to whether
the conduct offends morality or decorum are left up to the individual 
courts.  Viewing the lack of consistency in the analysis of conduct 
unbecoming and the lack of any definitive standards to demarcate this
elusive concept, it is not surprising that a court-martial could convict 
Lieutenant Commander Penland of conduct unbecoming without any 
finding of notoriety of the affair or any effect it had on her competency 
at work.188 
To begin, Penland was not married and was a high-ranking officer in
the Navy.189  Her coactor, Wiggan, was also an officer but belonged to a
separate chain of command, so the relationship presented no apparent 
fraternization issues.190  The prosecution offered no evidence of misuse
of government time or resources to commit the affair, nor any evidence 
that the affair had a detrimental effect on either’s unit or individual 
performance.191  In fact, the only evidence of the affair was pictures of 
186. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
187. United States v. Jefferson, 14 M.J. 806, 808–09 (A.C.M.R. 1982) (quoting 
WINTHROP, supra note 169, at 711–12), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 21 M.J. 203
(C.M.A. 1986). 
188. See Chris Amos, O-4 Sentenced to 60 Days in Adultery Case, NAVYTIMES, 
May 27, 2008, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/05/navy_penland_052508/ (“[T]he
prosecution’s only evidence of an affair were close-up pictures of sexual activity between two
people whose faces were not visible, and several e-mails purportedly between the
husband and wife that the husband denied writing.”). 
189. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 2. 
190. See id. Fraternization is the comingling of an officer and an enlisted
servicemember that is prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring 
discredit upon the armed forces.  See MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 83(b).  However, 
the Navy may have a separate regulation on fraternization that may have been implicated 
by the conduct.  See infra note 249 and accompanying text.  In addition, Wiggan was 
legally separated, which is one factor that the court should have considered when 
determining whether Penland’s adultery was prejudicial or service discrediting.  See 
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 2; MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 
62(c)(2)(h). 
191. See Amos, supra note 188.  Lieutenant Commander Kevin Messer, a Navy
prosecutor, stated that despite the adultery charge and conviction, the prosecution’s case 
was not about adultery and was about Penland using her rank to try to persuade Wiggan’s
wife, an enlisted servicemember, to divorce Wiggan. See Chris Amos, Reprisal Allegations in 
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sexual activity between two unidentifiable persons, whom Wiggan claimed 
to be himself and his ex-wife, not Penland.192  Based on the limited 
information available about the prosecution’s case, it is unclear exactly
how the government proved that the affair was prejudicial or amounted 
to conduct unbecoming.  Regardless of how the prosecution accomplished
this conviction, this case demonstrates that the factors193 meant to 
determine whether an adulterous act merits punishment have little to no 
effect on limiting adultery prosecutions in practice, especially in the
context of an article 133 prosecution. 
V. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONTINUING TO PUNISH
ADULTERY IN THE MILITARY 
In the past twenty years, while adultery prosecutions have almost 
completely fallen out of favor in the civilian justice system in America,194 
the American military has clung to the crime of adultery by continuously
and actively pursuing criminal prosecutions of adultery.195  These facts 
give one pause to consider why the military has deviated from the 
civilian code in this respect.196  Several possible explanations arise.
They include the value of maintaining a high level of morality and honor 
in the armed services, the importance of upholding good order and
discipline among servicemembers, and the necessity of preserving the
support of the American people.197  Despite the persuasiveness of these
Adultery Case Disputed, NAVYTIMES, June 16, 2008, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/ 
06/navy_penland_061408w/. 
192. See id. But see Reynolds, supra note 6 (quoting Penland, not Wiggan, as 
saying the pictures used had been taken of her with a previous boyfriend). 
193. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
195. See Winner, supra note 23, at 1077 (“In the past five years, the Air Force, 
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have court-martialed 900 men and women for charges 
that include adultery.”).  In addition, the U.S. Army Court of Military Review in United 
States v. Green acknowledged that adultery prosecutions are “not alien to the soldier’s 
concept of criminal law” and that “courts-martial for criminal adultery are not infrequent.” 39
M.J. 606, 609 (A.C.M.R. 1994). 
196. This is especially troubling considering that the drafters of the UCMJ attempt 
to mirror trends in the civilian world when updating the military’s statutes.  See supra
note 84. 
197. An additional unstated motive for pursuing adultery charges may be that it is a 
way for the military to get around the policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) by
prosecuting the adulterous conduct and not revealing its perhaps truer antigay motivation.
Coincidentally, the military alleges the same justifications for continuing the policy of 
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principles, prosecuting adultery in today’s military is no longer necessary to 
further these values and, in many cases, actually hinders their advancement. 
A.  Preserving Honor in the Armed Services 
First, one of the oldest and most basic concepts of military life is that
“there is a higher code termed honor, which holds [the military’s]
society to stricter accountability; and it is not desirable that the standard 
of the [military] shall come down to the requirements of a criminal
code.”198  Members of the military have long been expected to uphold a
higher standard of morality and honor than civilians.199  The reasoning 
behind this idea is that servicemembers are in positions of great
responsibility: commanders must order soldiers and marines into harm’s 
way to carry out missions, and officers hold the keys to missiles that 
could start a war.  Moreover, members of the military must constantly
choose to put service to their employer ahead of their personal lives and 
even their own safety.200 As a result, due to the demanding nature of
being a servicemember, the military justice system accepts that it must
carry a separate moral dimension not present in the civilian code.201 
Given the military’s high regard for morality and honor, it is plain to
see why the military criminalizes immoral behavior.  Nevertheless, the 
DADT—to prevent sexual misconduct and preserve “‘the armed forces’ high standards . . . of
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion . . . .”  See C. Dixon Osburn, A Policy in
Desperate Search of a Rationale: The Military’s Policy on Lesbians, Gays and 
Bisexuals, 64 UMKC L. REV. 199, 202 (1995) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14) (2006)). 
DADT continues to be litigated, and a complete discussion of the implications of DADT
is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For further information, see id.  For a defense of 
DADT, see Eugene R. Milhizer, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: A Qualified Defense, 21
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 349 (2004). 
198. Fletcher v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 541, 563 (1891), rev’d, 148 U.S. 84
(1893).  This famous quotation first appeared in the Fletcher decision in 1891 while 
discussing whether an officer may be found guilty of a crime that does not constitute a
crime in the civilian code.  See id. at 562–63. This same quotation has been used many
times over when explaining the compelling special interest of the military in the application of
the Constitution. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 765 (1974) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
199. See United States v. Mead, 63 M.J. 724, 728 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2006)
(“Roderick admitted during the providence inquiry that he ‘failed to live up to’ the
‘higher standard’ that applies to members of the military.”); Parker, 417 U.S. at 748 
(discussing “the military’s ‘higher code termed honor’ . . . with which those trained only
in civilian law are unfamiliar” (quoting Fletcher, 26 Ct. Cl. at 563)). 
200. See Winner, supra note 23, at 1092–93.  Members of the military can be
separated from their families for long periods of time without notice and, when called 
upon, have the ultimate duty to sacrifice their lives to protect the security interests of the
nation. Id. at 1093. 
201. See William T. Barto, The Scarlet Letter and the Military Justice System, ARMY 
LAW., Aug. 1997, at 3, 8. 
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courts-martial have not been able to agree on whether adultery is an 
inherently immoral activity.202  This illustrates one of the main difficulties 
in creating a code based on morality and honor: it is inherently subject to
the whims and private moralities of the individual judges and juries 
involved in each case.203  Perhaps a better route would be for the military
to steer away from laws based solely on morality and focus on criminalizing 
conduct with a quantifiable detrimental effect on the performance of 
military duties, such as fraternization.204 
Adultery also brings into the discussion the preservation of the family 
and marriage, another central aspect to the military’s definition of honor.205 
Adultery often leads to marital strife and sometimes the dissolution of 
the marriage, and the courts-martial have expressed that the military has 
a “particular interest in promoting the preservation of marriages within 
its ranks.”206  The view is that because the military requires spouses to 
be separated for extended periods of time, prosecuting adultery will help
ensure that the morale of the military will not be affected by concerns 
over the fidelity of a faraway spouse.207  The criminalization of adultery,
however, does little to help this cause.  First, only the military spouse 
can be prosecuted, while the civilian spouse is free to be unfaithful without 
any legal recourse.208  Second, the MCM allows punishment for adultery 
202. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
203. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
204. Fraternization is an example of an offense that focuses on conduct that has a 
quantifiable detrimental effect on the service as opposed to adultery, whose main harm is 
to the private marital relationship.  See MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 83; Hopkins, 
supra note 30, at 260.  The offense of fraternization requires that “[t]he acts and
circumstances must be as such to lead a reasonable person experienced in the problems 
of military leadership to conclude that the good order and discipline of the armed forces 
has been prejudiced.”  See MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 83(c)(1).  For further 
discussion of why punishing fraternization is preferable to punishing adultery, see infra
notes 246–53 and accompanying text. 
205. For example, in the MCM’s discussion of conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman, article 133, although describing its version of ideal moral attributes, lists
failing to support one’s family as an example of an immoral offense.  MCM, supra note 
13, pt. IV, ¶ 59(c)(3). 
206. United States v. Orellana, 62 M.J. 595, 601 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005); see
also United States v. Green, 39 M.J. 606, 609 (A.C.M.R. 1994) (“Close working and
living conditions and frequent family separations characteristic of military service give it
the potential for serious impact on good order and discipline.”). 
207. See Orellana, 62 M.J. at 601. 
208. The UCMJ and the offenses listed in the MCM only have jurisdiction over the 
military branches and civilians who accompany the military on its missions abroad.  See 
supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.  Consequently, a civilian spouse who is not a
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even when it does not actually impact the marital relationship, such as 
when the accused is technically married but legally separated from his
209spouse. 
Regardless of the reasons behind desiring servicemembers to have a 
high moral character, it is unfair to subject military personnel to criminal 
sanctions for failing to live up to “a higher, unreachable standard.”210 
The MCM itself even states that “[n]ot everyone is or can be expected to 
meet unrealistically high moral standards.”211  Given that adultery is not
uncommon in the general population,212 it seems unrealistic to require
servicemembers to always remain faithful and unfair to subject them to
criminal penalties for being only as moral as their civilian counterparts. 
B.  Upholding Good Order and Discipline 
Maintaining good order and discipline provides another justification
for the military to proscribe adultery.213  Discipline is crucial to maintaining 
the morale of servicemembers, preserving unit cohesion, and, ultimately, 
sustaining an effective military.214 
Members of the military need to be able to count on others in their 
unit.215  If one cannot trust his peer to control himself in his personal life,
contractor for the military will not be subject to the military’s adultery offense, unlike
the military spouse.
209. One example is the case against Lieutenant Commander Penland, who was single
and whose coactor was legally separated. See supra notes 189–92 and accompanying 
text; see also Hopkins, supra note 30, at 250–51 (noting that criminalizing adultery in 
situations in which the spouses are separated is illogical seeing that the adultery “does 
not actually impact the marital relationship”).  Furthermore, the Green court stated that
“[p]roof of prejudice to good order and discipline in criminal adultery cases does not . . . 
require that an accused’s marital relationship . . . be affected or potentially affected.”  39 
M.J. at 609. 
 210. Gasper, supra note 46, at 162. 
 211. MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 59(c)(2). 
212. See supra note 76. 
213. See Esquivel, supra note 56, at 856–57.  The Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy
recognized that the military is a “specialized society separate from civilian society”
because of the necessity to maintain obedience and discipline within the command so 
that the armies and navies can carry out their primary business of fighting wars, if it 
becomes necessary.  Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743–44 (1974). 
214. See Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court’s 
Jurisprudence in Military Cases, ARMY LAW., Jan. 1995, at 27, 29 (“It is called unit 
cohesion, and in my 40 years of Army service in three different wars, I have become 
convinced that it is the single most important factor in a unit’s ability to succeed on the 
battlefield.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-112, at 274–75 (1993) (statement of General H. 
Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army (Retired)))). 
215. See Burke, supra note 14, at 322.  The view is that if a soldier cannot trust 
another within his unit, then when he is faced with a life or death situation, the soldier is
more likely to surrender or fail because he cannot trust his fellow soldier.  See id.  As a
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then some believe it follows that he also cannot be trusted in combat.216 
One can easily think of scenarios in which someone’s promiscuous 
sexual conduct could cause disorder within a unit, such as when a superior 
and a subordinate within the same unit have a sexual relationship, or if a
soldier is carrying on an affair with the wife of another in his unit.  Both
of these situations would create distrust and conflict.  In the former
scenario, many within the unit would become suspicious of favoritism 
by the superior toward his lover, and the subordinate could also feel 
enormous pressure to maintain the relationship for fear of retaliation.217 
In the latter scenario, once the unit found out about the affair, besides the 
natural feelings of anger and jealousy of the jilted spouse, others would 
most likely lose their ability to trust the cheating soldier.  On the other
hand, the same type of disruption in unit cohesion could result if a 
soldier had an affair with the girlfriend of his peer or merely if two
members of the same unit had an intense personal rivalry.  There is no
law under the UCMJ, however, requiring personnel to be kind to each 
other, even though this would promote the important interest of unit 
cohesion.218 
Furthermore, adultery prosecutions have not been limited to cases in 
which the primary concern is maintaining discipline and order within a 
unit.219  Adultery can and has been prosecuted in cases involving a
servicemember and a civilian with no attachment to the military.220  It is
result, in order to maintain maximum military efficacy, members of the unit must be able
to rely on another member as if he were a brother.  See id.
216. See Winner, supra note 23, at 1104 (arguing that flaws in a soldier’s moral 
character interrupt the necessary instinctive unity and esprit de corps within a unit and,
therefore, put the mission and the servicemembers’ lives at risk); see also Beller v. 
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811–12 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that because some members 
of the military might find homosexuality morally wrong, this would undermine the 
ability of a homosexual to command the respect necessary to perform duties and might
cause disruption of unit cohesion), overruled by Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 
806 (9th Cir. 2008). 
217. See infra notes 246–53 and accompanying text.  This type of scenario would 
be prosecuted under fraternization, and adultery charges would be unnecessary to stop
these types of relationships.  See infra notes 246–51 and accompanying text.
218. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–934 (2006); MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV.
219. One example is the case against Captain Yee.  See supra notes 7–12 and 
accompanying text.  Yee was not part of any unit but was a minister to Muslim prisoners 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See Parker, supra note 7.
 220. In United States v. Green, for example, the court found a married,
noncommissioned officer guilty of adultery for having sex with a civilian in the barracks.  
39 M.J. 606, 609 (A.C.M.R. 1994); see also United States v. Butler, 5 C.M.R. 213, 213 
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unclear why the military would feel the need to regulate these relationships
under this rationale.221  In fact, continuing to prosecute adultery could 
have an adverse rather than uplifting effect on morale.  The truth is that
servicemembers are subject to harsh penalties when they are unfaithful 
to their spouses but have no resort to justice when their civilian spouses 
have extramarital relationships.222  This unfair result is a “demoralizing 
double standard”223 that would be eliminated by the deletion of adultery
as a criminal offense. 
C.  Maintaining the Trust of the American People
The final rationalization for criminalizing adultery is that the military
needs to maintain the trust and support of the American people.224  The
proposition is that if the military loses the respect and trust of the general
public, it will correspondingly lose support for its missions.225  The military 
has already experienced the negative effects of losing public support.226 
The Vietnam War provides an unsettling illustration of how a lack of 
public support can seriously harm the military.227  Moreover, it is ultimately 
(A.B.R. 1952) (discussing a situation in which a married Lieutenant was found guilty of 
“conducting himself in a manner unbecoming an officer and a gentleman . . . by
wrongfully occupying a bed with a German female” who was not his wife). 
221. See Hopkins, supra note 30, at 248.  Whereas there may be a need to regulate 
relationships between servicemembers because of the chance for abuse of authority or
the danger to unit cohesion, these same interests do not apply in the context of sex
between a servicemember and a civilian. See id.
222. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the potential 
punishments for adultery for servicemembers, see supra notes 88–90 and accompanying
text.
 223. Esquivel, supra note 56, at 856. 
224. The military has long had as one of its main goals capturing the support of the 
American public.  See Douglas W. Moore, Twenty-First Century Embedded Journalists: 
Lawful Targets?, ARMY LAW., July 2009, at 1, 4–5.  Ever since the Civil War when 
journalists first began reporting the news from the battlefield to the public, the military
has striven to utilize the media to garner public support for the war. See id. at 6.  The use 
of the press in earning public support has culminated currently in the practice of 
embedding journalists with units in combat.  See id. at 10.  For a complete discussion on
the risks and benefits of the modern embedded war correspondent system, see id.
225. See Winner, supra note 23, at 1105.
226. See Hopkins, supra note 30, at 230 (discussing the negative effects on the 
military caused by the lack of public support during the Vietnam War). 
227. See id.; see also Richard B. Jackson, Stick to the High Ground, ARMY LAW.,
July 2005, at 2, 9 (“It is also axiomatic in strategic thinking, since the Vietnam War, that
retaining public support is critical to military decision-making.”).  The lack of support 
for the Vietnam War was so devastating that the military changed its force structure to 
place greater reliance on the reserves, thinking that this would require civilian leaders to 
gain public support before committing the military to hostilities abroad.  See Glenn 
Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational Choice
Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1828 (2007). 
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the American people who provide the personnel and funds necessary to 
maintain the military infrastructure.228  Therefore, if the military loses 
the public’s support, it also risks losing these critical resources.229 
With adultery, the presumption promoted by the military is that 
whenever Americans discover that a servicemember is engaged in adultery, 
this knowledge erodes their trust not only in that individual but in the
entire organization.  Some argue that because the public entrusts the military 
with great responsibilities, Americans closely scrutinize the conduct of 
its members, even their personal sexual conduct, and any discovered
impropriety will lead to a loss of trust and support.230 An examination of 
the state of adultery prosecutions in the civilian world, however,
suggests that the general public is against, rather than for, sanctioning 
adultery criminally.231 
To start with, in at least two instances military courts have found that 
committing adultery did not offend local civilian law and, as a result, 
that adultery was not inherently discrediting to the service.232  In addition, 
the almost total absence of criminal adultery prosecutions in the civilian 
sector, even in the wake of numerous high-profile adultery scandals by
government officials, demonstrates the reluctance of the American public to
legally penalize adultery.233  And finally, the public reaction to previous
high-profile adultery prosecutions in the military illustrates that the 
public may even have contempt for these prosecutions and consequently
contempt for the institution that advances them.  For instance, the outcry
in reaction to the discharge of Lieutenant Kelly Flinn for adultery,234 
228. See Winner, supra note 23, at 1105 (“[T]he American people are the foundation of
the armed forces’ strength . . . .”). 
229. See id.
230. See supra note 170. 
231. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
232. See United States v. Green, 39 M.J. 606, 609 (A.C.M.R. 1994) (“[T]here was 
no indication that the appellant’s [adultery] offended either local civil law or community
standards. . . .  [I]mposition of punishment for adultery has become alien to the civilian’s 
concept of criminal law.”); United States v. Perez, 33 M.J. 1050, 1054 (A.C.M.R. 1991)
(“The government presented no evidence that the [adultery] offended local law or 
community standards.”).
233. See supra notes 28, 51–56 and accompanying text. 
234. Lieutenant Kelly Flinn, a pilot in the Air Force who had become somewhat of 
a poster girl for Air Force recruitment, carried on an affair with the civilian husband of
an enlisted woman at the same military base.  See Winner, supra note 23, at 1075–76;
Gregory L. Vistica & Evan Thomas, Sex and Lies: The Strange Case of Lieutenant Flinn 
Is Over, but in the Military the War over Women Goes On, NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1997, at 
26.  The Air Force prosecuted Flinn for adultery based on this affair, and her story
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echoed today in the media frenzy surrounding the discharge of Penland 
for her adultery charge,235 may indicate that the public believes criminalizing 
adultery charge is unnecessary and even archaic.  If the military is 
genuinely concerned about preserving public support, perhaps it should 
examine how the public actually feels about criminal sanctions for
adultery and abolish the offense of adultery.
VI. WHY THE MILITARY WOULD BE BETTER OFF   
WITHOUT THE CRIME OF ADULTERY
Even with the military’s numerous justifications for continuing to 
criminalize adulterous conduct, the military’s interests would be better 
advanced by removing adultery from the black-letter law of article 134.
First, usually when the military chooses to pursue an adultery charge, 
the adultery is merely one of a slew of more serious charges, such as
rape or assault.236  In those cases, the adultery is unnecessary to convict 
the servicemember of the crime and may even be duplicitous.237 In 
United States v. Jefferson, for example, the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals overturned the adultery charges against the defendant, finding
that they were “multiplicious” because they were based on the same 
garnered the full attention of the American public.  See Winner, supra note 23, at 1076. 
For an in-depth discussion of the background of the case and a defense of the choice to
prosecute Flinn for adultery by the Air Force, see id. at 1074–79. 
235. Penland’s story was the subject of several articles in the Navy Times, see, e.g., 
Amos, supra note 188, featured in the San Diego Union Tribune, see Steve Liewer, 
supra note 3, and on San Diego’s Channel 10 News, see Reynolds, supra note 6.
Besides the media frenzy, Penland’s story is also a popular subject of many Internet 
forums, most of them calling her story an injustice.  See, e.g., Height of Hypocrisy—Is 
There Really Justice in the Military Courts, MILITARYTIMES FORUM, http://militarytimes.
com/forum/showthread.php?t=1578663.  Penland herself alleged that the Navy discharged her
avoid any further media coverage.  See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 2.so
quickly because of the amount of negative publicity generated by her story, hoping to
236. See, e.g., United States v. Velazquez, NMCCA 200602421, 2007 WL 2340612, at
*1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2007) (adultery, breaking restriction, and indecent
assault); United States v. Flores, ACM 36218, 2006 WL 3895072, at *1–2 (A.F. Ct. 
Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2006) (rape, indecent acts, conspiring to wrongfully use cocaine, 
burglary, and adultery).  Lawrence J. Korb of the Brookings Institute stated that when adultery
prosecutions occur, they are more “aimed at a member of the Armed Forces already in
trouble for something else,” likening it to “‘getting Al Capone on income tax evasion.’” 
Maravilla, supra note 75, at 660 (quoting Fisher, supra note 75). 
237. The MCM requires that what is substantially one transaction not be charged as 
two or more offenses.  MCM, supra note 13, pt. II, r. 307(c)(4).  Therefore, an offense
and a lesser-included offense for the same transaction should never be separately
charged. See id. pt. II, r. 307(c)(4) discussion.  For a complete discussion of the 
challenging aspect of double jeopardy in military practice, see generally Christopher S.
Morgan, Multiplicity: Reconciling the Manual for Courts-Martial, 63 A.F. L. REV. 23
(2009). 
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incidents as the fraternization charges.238  In that case, the adultery 
charges were not only unnecessary but even hurt the government’s case 
by exposing it to reversal on appeal for potential overreaching.239 
When adultery is prosecuted as an unrelated charge or as the leading 
charge—cases that are the exception240—the armed services have shown 
a propensity to use adultery as a means of humiliation and retaliation.241 
An example of this is the case against Captain John Yee, whom the 
Army humiliated with an adultery charge tacked on after its original case
fell apart.242  Even the Cox Commission, a group brought together by the 
National Institute of Military Justice in 2001 to evaluate and recommend
changes to the UCMJ,243 pointed out that the majority of adulterous acts 
in the military are not prosecuted, and when they are, they create a 
“powerful perception” that the prosecution of adultery “is treated in an
arbitrary, even vindictive, manner.”244  The military justice system itself 
has urged that adultery be dealt with informally by nonjudicial punishment
238. United States v. Jefferson, 21 M.J. 203, 204 (C.M.A. 1986). 
239. See id.  The court in Jefferson decided not to remand the case for sentencing 
after concluding that the appellant suffered no prejudice as to his sentence from the
multiplicity. Id.  Multiplication of charges is an ever-present danger in military law
because many offenses are not the product of statutes but come from orders or customs 
of the armed services.  See United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334, 337, 347–48 (C.A.A.F. 
2001) (discussing the history of and the standard for an unreasonable multiplication of 
charges in the unique context of military law).
240. In an interview with Navy Region Southwest Spokesman Doug Sayers, in
response to a question about how many people have been court-martialed for adultery, 
Sayers responded, “[I]t’s probably fair to say that not many people (almost none) have 
been court-martialed for adultery alone.”  Navy Spokesman Answers I-Team Questions,
10NEWS.COM, http://www.10news.com/print/20135940/detail.html (last visited Nov. 15, 
2010); see also Maravilla, supra note 75, at 672 (“[A]dultery [is] often not really the 
primary issue, but instead [is] usually secondary to a more serious crime.”). 
241. The adultery charges against Lieutenant Commander Penland and Captain Yee 
are two examples in which the military has pursued adultery prosecutions under 
suspicious circumstances. See supra notes 2–12, 189–93 and accompanying text. 
242. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
243. See NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 2.
244. See id. at 11; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Military Appeals, supra note 78, at *13–14 (“I believe statistics will demonstrate that 
at least 50% of the males in the Air Force have experienced extra-marital relationships.  I 
can name names of high ranking officers who are well known to be involved in such
activity and it is simply winked at.” (quoting Colonel Lipscomb)).
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as much as possible,245 showing that even the military realizes that the
law is unpopular and unnecessary.
The needlessness of the crime of the adultery is further illustrated by
the fact that existing sanctions provided by the UCMJ are sufficient to 
accomplish the same goals.246  Inappropriate relationships that harm unit
cohesion and disrupt good order and discipline are already criminalized
under article 134’s offense of fraternization.247  Fraternization punishes
any improper relationship between an officer and an enlisted member
that is prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to discredit 
the armed forces, regardless of whether either actor is married.248 
Moreover, the UCMJ allows each military branch to determine its own 
regulations on fraternization, and as a result, each branch can also
proscribe improper relationships between enlisted personnel of different 
ranks or officers of different ranks.249  Additionally, dishonesty itself is
already sanctioned by article 107—the article for punishing false official 
statements.250 Therefore, two of the most troubling issues about a
servicemember who commits adultery—that the servicemember is
labeled as untrustworthy or that the affair tends to disrupt order within 
245. See Hopkins, supra note 30, at 259 (explaining how the military decided not to
rescind its policy of criminalizing adultery but balanced that move by encouraging more
informal responses to adultery charges). 
246. See NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 11. 
247. See supra note 190.  In addition, fraternization, unlike adultery, has 
traditionally always been a military offense, providing another reason why prosecuting 
fraternization would be preferable to prosecuting adultery in the military. See Cox,
supra note 81, at 792, 795. 
 248. MCM, supra note 13, pt. IV, ¶ 83.  To determine if the relationship is 
improper, the MCM lists several circumstances that commanders and judges should
consider when determining whether the interaction amounted to fraternization.  These 
include “whether the conduct has compromised the chain of command, resulted in 
appearance of partiality, or otherwise undermined good order, discipline, authority, or
morale.” Id. pt. IV, ¶ 83(c)(1). 
249. See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2006); Martha 
Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 305, 352 (1998).  Article 92 allows the punishment of any person who
“violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation.”  10 U.S.C. § 892(1).
Therefore, each branch may create its own regulation on fraternization and punish any
violation of that regulation under article 92 as an act of disobedience.  See Chamallas,
supra, at 352.  For a discussion of each service branch’s separate regulations on
fraternization, see Paul H. Turney, Relations Among the Ranks: Observations of and 
Comparisons Among the Service Policies and Fraternization Case Law, 1999, ARMY
LAW., Apr. 2000, at 97, 99–103. 
250. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 107, 10 U.S.C. § 907 (2006).  The statute 
punishes any person subject to the UCMJ who, “with intent to deceive, signs any false 
record, return, regulation, order, or other official document, knowing it to be false, or 
makes any other false official statement knowing it to be false.”  Id.; MCM, supra note 
13, pt. IV, ¶ 31. 
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the unit—can be corrected without the use of the adultery offense.251 
Fraternization also addresses the serious problem that although some
sexual conduct in the military appears to be consensual, it may actually 
be coercive sexual misconduct in the military context of rank, even if 
both servicemembers are unmarried.252  The Cox Commission agrees
that even though some instances of adultery amount to criminal conduct
in the military context, “[v]irtually all such acts . . . could be prosecuted
without the use of provisions specifically targeting . . . adultery.”253  In  
addition, these proscriptions promote military effectiveness with clear
offenses that punish specific acts without delving into subjective and 
unclear factors, such as whether the public would disapprove of the 
conduct or whether it is immoral.254 
Moreover, although the military promotes the crime of adultery as a 
method to increase troop morale, these prosecutions may indeed have 
the opposite effect on servicemembers.  First, the unfair and arbitrary
fashion with which the military pursues adultery prosecutions today 
cannot have any positive effect on the confidence and camaraderie 
251. See Winner, supra note 23, at 1103–04 (“Flaws in a soldier’s moral character . 
. . put the mission and additional lives at risk. . . .  [A]dultery entails an additional 
harmful element . . . .  Namely, an adulterous affair ‘inevitably involves deceit,’ and, 
most likely, deceit of one’s own spouse and children.” (quoting Evan Thomas, Shifting
Lines: After Cracking Down on an Adulterous Female Pilot, the Brass Shields an
Adulterous Male General, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1997, at 32, 38 (quoting General Charles 
Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps))). 
252. Because of the increased number of women in the armed forces, fraternization
has become increasingly concerned with social and sexual relationships between officers
and enlisted members. See SCHLUETER, supra note 72, § 2-8; see also NAT’L INST. OF 
MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 12 (describing the potential for coercive sexual
misconduct in the military); Hopkins, supra note 30, at 241–45 (discussing the 
motivations for prosecuting fraternization as eliminating potential favoritism in the chain
of command and potential abuses of power by a higher ranked servicemember if the 
lower-ranked member does not comply with sexual demands). 
 253. NAT’L INST. OF MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 11. 
254. See supra Part IV.A.1–2.  However, some believe that fraternization has the 
same pitfalls as the prohibition of adultery—that the offense is vague, unclear, and 
subjective—because it is also a sample offense under article 134.  See Chamallas, supra
note 249, at 350–51.  On the other hand, many commentators believe that fraternization, 
unlike adultery, focuses more on military issues of order and discipline because of its
emphasis on rank, and therefore does not impact morale or conflict with civilian views in 
the way that adultery does. See Maravilla, supra note 75, at 676 (noting that the 
prohibition against adultery undermines the military’s relationship with civilian society 
more than the adulterous conduct itself because there is often “no justification on the side 
of order and discipline”). 
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among servicemembers.255  To allow adultery to carry on all around 
without any repercussion256 and then to turn around and reprimand 
Lieutenant Commander Penland with a general court-martial for the 
same conduct257 seems like a very strange way to promote morale.258 
Additionally, the punishment for adultery is exceptionally harsh, especially 
considering the amount of the general population that engages in
adultery.259  First, whenever a servicemember receives a punishment, a
negative annotation appears in the servicemember’s permanent military
record.260  These records are examined for purposes of a promotion, and 
as a result, an adultery conviction could effectively end a military 
career.261  In addition, because adultery can be prosecuted by a general 
court-martial, a conviction is essentially equivalent to a felony for purposes
of state law,262 which also means that it can be reported to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s Criminal Justice Information System.263 This
255. See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra notes 80–83, and accompanying text. 
257. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
258. In addition, servicemembers face a double standard when they are subject to
harsh penalties for adultery, whereas their civilian spouses will not face criminal liability
for the same type of adulterous conduct.  See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying 
text.
259. See supra note 81.  Even though she did not receive the maximum punishment
available, Lieutenant Commander Penland’s sentence is especially severe because she 
suffers from thrombocytosis and would have received continued free healthcare if she
had been allowed to carry out the last few months of her twenty years of service and
retire with benefits.  See supra note 3.  For others, the punishment’s effects are even
more deeply felt, as in the case of Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Karen Tew, who 
committed suicide after pleading guilty to an affair and being dismissed from the service
one year short of retirement. See Fisher, supra note 75. 
260. See Esquivel, supra note 56, at 855. 
261. See id. (“Because the military has a policy of attrition for servicemembers who 
do not attain certain levels of promotion, any judicial or non-judicial punishment can
effectively end a military career.” (footnote omitted)).
 262. Amos, supra note 188 (quoting Penland’s defense lawyer, Marine Captain 
Patrick Callahan, who stated that an adultery conviction in a general court-martial is 
equivalent to a felony conviction in civilian courts). 
263. Army Regulations only require the reporting of certain offenses to the Criminal
Justice Information System, including murder, robbery, and rape, but not including 
adultery.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190–45, LAW ENFORCEMENT 
REPORTING, § 4–10 (2007), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r190_45.pdf; 
Gasper, supra note 46, at 175.  But military confinement facilities also report criminal 
information to the Criminal Justice Information System and must report criminal 
information about a prisoner whose sentence is for an offense that carries a possible
sentence of confinement of one year or more, thus including an adultery conviction as an
offense that requires reporting. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190– 
47, LAW ENFORCEMENT REPORTING, § 10–2 (2006), available at http://www.army.mil/ 
usapa/epubs/pdf/r190_47.pdf.  Consequently, if sentenced to the brig for adultery, this 
information will make it into the Criminal Justice Information System.  See id. 
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means the conviction stays with the servicemember long after that 
individual leaves the service, and thus, any court-martial conviction should
not be taken lightly.  Depending on the particular state’s definition of a 
felony, a conviction could affect the servicemember’s voting rights, the
right to own a weapon, and could even lead to a denial of retirement and 
Veteran’s Affairs (VA) benefits.264  Furthermore, if a servicemember
loses retirement benefits, there would be no recourse to appeal that
decision.265  The benefits are simply gone forever. 
Civilians who accompany the military on its missions abroad are now
also subject to the statutes under the UCMJ, due to a law enacted by
Congress in 2007.266  As of yet, there have not been any reported adultery
prosecutions of civilians under the UCMJ, presumably because civilians 
have less risk of prejudicing good order and discipline and their conduct
does not usually reflect upon the armed services.267  Moreover, adultery
prosecutions against civilians may be unconstitutional,268 assuming that
the special interest269 afforded to the military when regulating its personnel
is not applicable to civilians who accompany the military abroad.  Even 
if the military decides never to prosecute civilians for adultery to avoid 
potential constitutional issues, it will create another double standard 
under the UCMJ by allowing some to philander while others subject to
264. See Jeff Walker, The Practical Consequences of a Court-Martial Conviction,
ARMY LAW., Dec. 2001, at 1, 9. Penland will lose her retirement and health benefits, even 
though she is suffering from a serious disorder, thrombocytosis, which requires intensive 
medical treatment.  See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 3.  Access to 
other medical insurance will be difficult because she has this preexisting condition.  See 
id. at 4. Admittedly, Penland will still have access to VA hospitals but will not have the
same level healthcare she would have received had she been allowed to retire.  See supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
265. See Walker, supra note 264, at 12. 
266. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
267. Nothing is certain in the area of military adultery prosecutions, however, and 
given the tendency of military prosecutors to pursue adultery charges in retaliation and 
with the intent to humiliate, it is clear that not even civilian contractors are completely
safe from such a charge.  See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text.  Plus, should a 
civilian’s affair invoke the wrath of a military commander, an adultery prosecution is
certainly foreseeable. See Dan E. Stigall, An Unnecessary Convenience: The Assertion
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) over Civilians and the Implications 
of International Human Rights Law, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 59, 67 (2009). 
268. See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text; see also Maravilla, supra note 
75, at 668 (“[T]he consensual nature of an adulterous relationship in private should be 
afforded the same constitutional protections regardless of the context.”). 
269. See supra note 198. 
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the same set of laws must face severe penalties for the same actions.270 
To avoid these potential conflicts, the entire armed services would be 
better served by eliminating the offense of adultery and only proscribing
conduct that directly affects the proper function of the military.271 
VII. CONCLUSION
It is without question that the crime of adultery has fallen out of favor
in the civilian justice system.  Why, then, does the military cling to this 
outdated law?  The claim is that the regulation of some adulterous conduct
is necessary to maintain the support of the American people, to uphold 
good order and discipline, and to preserve the concept of honor among 
servicemembers.  Assuming the validity of these interests, they all can
be furthered by prosecuting the conduct through other existing offenses.
Moreover, some of these interests are actually hindered by the continued 
exploitation of the adultery offense by military prosecutors, the uneven 
application of the statute to servicemembers, and the many double
standards created by the presence of the crime of adultery.  To maintain 
troop morale and the support of the civilian world, the military should do
the honorable thing and eliminate the crime of adultery. 
270. See supra notes 260–65 and accompanying text. 
271. Proscribing fraternization is an example of an offense that focuses more on the
effect of the conduct on good order and discipline.  See supra notes 204, 254 and
accompanying text.  Concededly, even if the government eliminated adultery from the 
MCM, prosecutors could still pursue adultery charges under the general article, article 
134, which allows prosecutions of any conduct deemed to prejudice good order and
discipline.  Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006).  However,
because adultery prosecutions were rare before the addition of the adultery offense in
1984 and their popularity did not catch on until after the appearance of the enumerated
offense, most likely the prosecutions would decline steadily again after the deletion of 
the crime of adultery. See Hopkins, supra note 30, at 247 (“Prosecutions for adultery
soared after the passage of the 1984 amendments to the MCM.”). 
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